Inhibitory Processing of Sad Facial Expressions and Depression Vulnerability by Bistricky, Steven L.
 
 
INHIBITORY PROCESSING OF SAD FACIAL EXPRESSIONS AND DEPRESSION 
VULNERABILITY 
 
BY 
 
Steven L. Bistricky 
 
Submitted to the graduate degree program in Psychology and the Faculty of the 
Graduate School of the University of Kansas in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
 
Chairperson 
 
Rick Ingram, Ph.D.___________________________ 
 
 
Committee members 
Ruth Ann Atchley, Ph.D.______________________ 
 
Nancy Hamilton, Ph.D. _______________________ 
 
Sarah Pressman, Ph.D.________________________ 
 
William Skorupski, Ed.D._____________________ 
 
 
Date defended: _December 3, 2010______________ 
 
   
 ii 
The Dissertation Committee for Steven L. Bistricky certifies that this is the approved version 
of the following dissertation: 
 
INHIBITORY PROCESSING OF SAD FACIAL EXPRESSIONS AND DEPRESSION 
VULNERABILITY 
 
 
 
Chairperson 
 
Rick Ingram, Ph.D.___________________________ 
 
 
Committee members 
Ruth Ann Atchley, Ph.D.______________________ 
 
Nancy Hamilton, Ph.D. _______________________ 
 
Sarah Pressman, Ph.D.________________________ 
 
William Skorupski, Ed.D._____________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Date approved: December 3, 2010 
 
 
   
 iii 
Abstract 
Depression vulnerability has been frequently linked to selective attention biases, but these 
biases may partly result from an inhibitory deficit for processing depressive information 
(Joormann, 2004). Reduced inhibition when encountering sad interpersonal information (e.g., 
faces) could lead to greater associative processing, deeper encoding among related depressive 
content in memory, increased rumination, and perhaps promote depressive episodes. Inhibition 
and selective attention can be examined through behavioral and psychophysiological indicators, 
including the N200, P300a, and P300b ERP components. The present study examined whether 
groups traditionally at risk of depression would show inhibitory deficits for depressive facial 
expressions as compared to a low-risk group. A 2 x 2 design yielded four groups with two levels 
of current dysphoria status (yes/no) and history of depression (yes/no), enabling comparisons of 
relative risk. Each participant completed two visual oddball tasks. In the experimental task, 
participants responded or inhibited a response to infrequently presented sad or happy target faces 
in the context of frequently presented neutral faces. In the non-affective control task, participants 
responded only to faces that fit into one of three broad age groupings. Behavioral (e.g., reaction 
times, response errors), psychophysiological (ERP components), and self-report (e.g., 
rumination) measures relevant to selective attention and inhibition were analyzed. Between- and 
within-groups contrasts were conducted to reveal whether at-risk groups exhibit attentional bias 
and inhibitory deficiency specific to depressive information. Also, the study examined whether 
different operationalizations of depression risk evince common or distinct mechanisms of 
vulnerability. Across the full sample, previous depression was associated with greater P3b 
amplitude for sad target faces than happy target faces, in contrast with the depression naïve 
group. However in males, only the combination of previous depression and current dysphoria 
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were linked to elevated P3s following sad targets. Evidence for a sad affect inhibition deficit was 
limited to dysphoric females’ increased errors of commission following sad distracter faces. 
Results suggest that specific operationalizations of risk may be characterized by an attentional 
bias toward depressive facial affect in the social environment, which could promote additional 
depressogenic cognition and social behavior. Theoretical ramifications regarding gender and 
state versus trait vulnerability are also discussed. 
Keywords: Depression, Vulnerability, Bias, Facial Emotion, ERP, Cognitive Neuroscience 
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Inhibitory Processing of Sad Facial Expressions and Depression Vulnerability 
Two robust strains of research indicate that depressed individuals show patterns of negative 
cognition and deficits in social function. Further, theories have long proposed that cognitive and 
interpersonal factors are salient to the etiology, maintenance and treatment of major depression 
(Beck, 1967; Lewinsohn, 1974). Specifically, cognitive theories of depression have proposed 
that negative biases in attention and memory characterize depressed individuals and those who 
are at risk of developing depression. Interpersonal theories have suggested that social deficits 
impede reinforcement and often evoke punishing responses in social interactions. Integrating 
interpersonal themes with cognitive models, depression vulnerability might be associated with 
cognitive biases in processing social affective information. Human facial expressions in the 
social environment effectively transmit and evoke emotions (Ruys & Stapel, 2008), and a 
developing collection of studies has begun to examine whether depression and depression 
vulnerability are characterized by cognitive biases related to processing affective faces. Evidence 
suggests that depressed and depression susceptible individuals may attend to, interpret, and 
remember affective facial expressions in distinct ways that initiate or maintain depressive 
patterns of mood and cognition (Bistricky, Ingram, & Atchley, 2010). However, there is much to 
be learned about these apparent cognitive biases and how they may be instantiated in particular 
patterns of neural activity. Research is needed to elucidate possible mechanisms of risk. 
The present research project employed behavioral and neuroelectric measurement tools to 
examine whether depression susceptible individuals exhibit depressotypic attentional biases and 
inhibitory deficits when they encounter affective facial expressions, which could contribute to 
them becoming and remaining depressed. However, before detailing the current research, the 
relevant context from which it emerges is reviewed. First, conceptual and methodological issues 
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that influence contemporary investigation of depression vulnerability are discussed. Next, 
evidence is reviewed regarding depressotypic cognitive biases found in groups representing 
different operationalizations of depression risk. This leads into more focused consideration of 
selective attention, inhibition, and a proposed theoretical model in which attentional bias 
promotes vulnerability to depression. Subsequently, the introduction provides a rationale for 
examining interpersonal facial expression processing biases and a brief summary of studies that 
have done so. Finally, I examine how cognitive neuroscience research (specifically event-related 
potentials; ERP) techniques are elucidating the neural underpinnings of attentional processing, 
and propose that these techniques can significantly augment the current understanding of 
depressotypic attentional biases toward affective interpersonal information.  
Studying Depression and Depression Vulnerability 
Although individuals can be directly classified as depressed by meeting diagnostic criteria, 
operationalizing depression vulnerability is necessarily indirect. Studies typically operationalize 
vulnerability to depression according to known risk factors, then compare high risk groups to 
low risk groups on variables hypothesized to mediate greater risk. Vulnerable groups are often 
composed of individuals who have experienced a past major depressive episode or who are 
currently dysphoric. Major depression is characterized by a high rate of recurrence, and the risk 
of recurrence increases with each new depressive episode (American Psychiatric Association, 
2000). Similarly, individuals with subclinical depressive syndromes may be up to six-times more 
likely to develop major depression in the long-term than individuals who have never experienced 
a subclinical syndrome (Cuijpers & Smit, 2004; Eaton, Badawi, & Melton, 1995; Warner, 
Weissman, Fendrich, Wickramaratne, & Moreau, 1992). Thus, significantly increased risk for 
depression is indicated by the presence of stable dysphoria, a subclinical syndrome that can 
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include depressive and anxious symptoms (Ingram & Hamilton, 1999).  
Beyond being markers of increased risk, depression history and current dysphoria may 
exemplify a diathesis-stress vulnerability model compatible with contemporary 
conceptualizations of depressive onset. Operationalizing depression history as a diathesis trait 
and dysphoria as a triggered stress state facilitates the exploration of complementary premises 
about vulnerability processes. First, those who have experienced major depression might be 
distinguished, from early development on, by factors (e.g., physiological, cognitive, 
interpersonal) that facilitate the development of depressive episodes. It had long been proposed 
that any such candidate factor found in formerly depressed persons could represent a permanent 
change, or scar, resulting from a past depressive episode (Lewinsohn, Steinmetz, Larson, & 
Franklin, 1981), but prospective tests have not supported the scar hypothesis (Beevers, Rohde, 
Stice, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2007; Shea, et al., 1996). Thus, formerly depressed individuals may 
possess vulnerability factors long before and after their first onset. Second, dysphoria is thought 
to represent more of a state-dependent influence because, although it endures far longer than a 
transient mood induction, it is typically far less stable than major depression. Based on this 
profile, investigators assess research participants at two time points separated by weeks (i.e., 
double gating) to ensure the presence of stable dysphoria. A third premise, following from the 
first two, is that a person with a history of depression and current dysphoria would possess both 
state and operationalizations of increased risk. From a diathesis-stress or a cumulative risk 
perspective, this dual-risk individual might be imminently more vulnerable to depression than a 
person with only one of these risk factors. Given the paucity of research that includes all three of 
these operationalizations of risk, there is a clear need to understand and compare mechanisms of 
risk in these groups. 
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Evidence of Cognitive Biases in Depression Vulnerable Populations 
It has long been proposed that biases in selective attention, interpretation, and memory 
exist in depression vulnerable individuals (Beck, 1967). From a cognitive diathesis-stress 
perspective, vulnerable individuals are thought to possess a depressive cognitive “schema” that 
distinguishes them from nonvulnerable individuals. When activated, this schema generates 
depressogenic information processing patterns that ultimately lead to the development of 
depression (Beck, 1967; Ingram, 1984; Ingram, Miranda, & Segal, 1998). When a depressive 
schema is not activated, it is characterized as “latent but reactive” to stress, such as event-
triggered dysphoria (Segal & Shaw, 1986). Studies employing mood-priming have largely 
supported this idea of cognitive reactivity (see Scher, Ingram, & Segal, 2005; Segal & Ingram, 
1994 for reviews). That is, formerly depressed individuals in a nondysphoric mood usually 
cannot be distinguished from never depressed nondysphoric individuals in terms of self-report or 
performance-based affective cognition. However, typically when each of these groups complete 
an affective challenge (e.g., sad mood induction), depressotypic patterns of cognition emerge 
only in the formerly depressed group (e.g., McCabe, Gotlib, & Martin, 2000). Although 
cognitive models originally conceived depressive biases to be strictly toward negative 
information, subsequent theories and data support the existence of biases away from positive 
information as well (Clark, Beck, & Stewart, 1990). Dual-valence biases appear consistent with 
major depressive episode presentations, which are often characterized by both increased negative 
affect and decreased positive affect (Clark & Watson, 1991), but these biases also may contribute 
to the development of depressive onsets in subsyndromal individuals. 
It is worth noting that a few recent psychophysiological studies have reported evidence of 
depressotypic cognitive processing in the absence of sad mood in formerly depressed individuals 
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(Atchley, Ilardi, & Enloe, 2003; Atchley, Stringer, Mathias, Ilardi, & Minatrea, 2007; also see 
Steidtmann, Ingram, & Siegle, 2010 pre-mood induction finding). Important theoretical and 
methodological issues emanate from these findings. First, active cognitive vulnerability factors 
may be present in nondysphoric depression-susceptible individuals. Secondly, modern cognitive 
neuroscience techniques may complement traditional behavioral performance measures of 
cognition to increase researchers’ ability to detect depressogenic patterns of information 
processing, such as biases in selective attention. For example, if differences in performance are 
not found in a study but differences in neural activity are observed, there could be several 
possible explanations. Measures of neural activity might provide better resolution for detecting 
differences; neural activity differences might precede the appearance of performance differences; 
or alternate areas of the brain might compensate to maintain normal task performance 
(Drummond, Gillin, & Brown, 2001; Sumich, Kumari, Heasman, Gordon, & Brammer, 2006). 
This idea is central to the proposed research.  
Also pertinent, biases in selective attention related to processing emotional information 
have been found to distinguish dysphoric individuals from nondysphoric individuals (Bradley, 
Mogg, & Lee, 1997; Koster, De Raedt, Goeleven, Franck, & Crombez, 2005; Siegle, Ingram, & 
Matt, 2002). Prior to reviewing research that has examined depressotypic attention biases toward 
affective facial expression stimuli, a brief primer on selective attention and inhibition is included 
to provide background and theoretical rationale that implicates these interrelated processes as a 
plausible mechanism of vulnerability and maintenance.  
Selective Attention and Inhibition 
Selective attention requires discriminating incoming information that is relevant to a 
current objective from information that is irrelevant, subsequently activating the relevant and 
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inhibiting the irrelevant (Houghton & Tipper, 1994; Neill, Valdes, & Terry, 1995). Inhibition is 
also thought to be instrumental in efficient memory encoding and retrieval. In the case of 
deficient inhibitory processing, irrelevant information can become associated with goal-relevant 
material during encoding. Consequently, subsequent retrieval of goal-relevant information may 
also activate the associated irrelevant information. 
Depressotypic selective attention has long been hypothesized to be a vulnerability 
mechanism for depression, but recently it has been proposed that this phenomenon could be 
partly due to a specific inhibitory deficit for processing depressive information. Although prior 
research has implicated general executive deficits in response inhibition (e.g., Kaiser, Unger, 
Kiefer, Markela, Mundt et al., 2003), Joormann (2004) found that on an emotion-focused 
negative priming information processing task, dysphoric individuals exhibited an inhibition 
deficiency specifically for negative words compared to positive words. Specifically, following 
negative distracter word primes, dysphoric individuals showed deficient inhibitory carryover 
from prime to test presentations, resulting in faster reaction times for negative targets as 
compared to positive-positive trials. In an another experiment, Joormann (2004) found that 
presently euthymic formerly depressed individuals exhibited significantly less inhibition to 
negative self-referent words than never depressed individuals. This might suggest a possible 
trait-like vulnerability factor specific to self-concept related processing.  
Extending this putative mechanism, when an individual is focusing on emotional 
information, a global selective attentional bias or a specific inhibitory deficit for negative 
information might lead to increased elaborative processing of negative content. With time and 
repetition, this pattern could strengthen connections among depressive cognitive structures 
(Ingram, 1984). Also, when an individual attempts to focus attention on nonaffective task-
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relevant information but previously activated negative cognitive content has been degraded (i.e., 
another inhibitory function) insufficiently, the negative content could linger and contaminate 
working memory. The remaining activated task-irrelevant negative content, or cognitive residue, 
could produce several maladaptive consequences. As suggested earlier, associations between 
task-relevant nonaffective information and irrelevant depressive information could be paired in 
encoding and later retrieval. Once this occurs, depressive cognitive structures could be activated 
and strengthened by activating depressive or associated nonaffective information (Linville, 
1996). Also, depressive cognitive residue could interfere with working memory, leading to 
impaired performance in the kinds of complex problem solving required in daily life, ultimately 
increasing depressive thoughts and feelings. For this individual, the omnipresent salience of a 
depressive schema could override attempts to focus on nonaffective goal-relevant information 
processing, resulting in the subjective experience of intrusive streams of depressive thoughts. 
Therefore, selective attention biases for depressive information could lead to patterns of 
rumination, which would perpetuate depressive moods (Nolen-Hoeksema, Morrow, & 
Fredrickson, 1993) and deeply encode depressive memories, the combination of which might 
initiate or maintain depressive episodes.  
Selective Attention to Affective Facial Expressions and Depression Vulnerability 
Although the majority of studies investigating possible emotional information processing 
biases in depressive populations have used lexical stimuli, there are good reasons to employ 
facial expression stimuli. First, facial affect can simultaneously reveal the tenor of a social milieu 
and influence one’s feelings (Ruys & Stapel, 2008; Wild, Erb, & Bartels, 2001). As such, an 
attentional bias toward sad expressions could result in disproportionately depressive moods and 
mental representations of the social environment. Second, direct angle emotional faces likely 
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trigger automatic self-referent processing (i.e., “she is glancing at me”) as well as self-relative-
to-other processing (e.g., “is her reaction to me unfavorable and dominant?”). In this way, facial 
expressions may evoke the looking glass self, which is continually shaped by others’ reflections 
and responses. An attentional bias toward others’ sad, discouraged affect could thus lead to 
frequent negative attributions and a devalued sense of self-worth (e.g., “I make people 
unhappy”). Third, inasmuch as emotions are preparatory states for behavior, perceiving facial 
affect would ordinarily prime rapid, appropriate social reactions. Conversely, language is 
typically more abstract and detached from the immediate setting. Consistent with this conceptual 
difference, empirical evidence indicates that facial affect may be a more evocative emotional 
medium than words (De Houwer & Hermans, 1994; Glaser & Glaser, 1989; Vanderploeg, 
Brown, & Marsh, 1987). Thus, tasks that utilize affective facial stimuli might more reliably 
evoke pathology-specific emotional information processing biases (Gotlib, Krasnoperova, Yue, 
& Joormann, 2004). Fourth, and in the same vein, facial affect embodies particularly relevant 
information to depression-susceptible individuals negotiating complex interpersonal 
environments. Impairment in interpersonal functioning is a common feature in depressive 
syndromes and may prolong periods of dysphoria (Coyne, 1976; Segrin & Abramson, 1994; 
Swann, Wenzlaff, Krull, & Pelham, 1992). Negatively biased processing of interpersonal 
affective information might promote social isolation and rejection-eliciting behaviors.  
Based on studies using behavioral measures (reaction times, accuracy/error rates), 
depressed individuals generally show unbiased recognition of unambiguous facial expressions of 
sadness and happiness (Segrin, 2001), but they can exhibit impaired recognition of subtle mildly-
happy or ambiguous-neutral facial expressions (e.g., Gollan, Pane, McCloskey, & Coccaro, 
2008; Gur et al., 1992; Leppanen, Milders, Bell, Terriere, & Hietanen, 2004; Raes, Hermans, & 
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Williams, 2006; Surguladze et al., 2004). Specifically, depressed individuals tend to take longer 
to classify neutral faces and are more apt to mistakenly assign sad affective meaning to them 
than nondepressed individuals, who can show positivistic biases to neutral faces (Gollan, et al., 
2008; Gur, et al., 1992; Leppanen, et al., 2004; Surguladze, et al., 2004). Therefore, at a practical 
level, studies that enroll depressed or depression susceptible groups to examine attention and 
memory for affective facial stimuli need to rule out interpretive biases as a potential confounding 
variable. In addition, preliminary evidence suggests that depression and perhaps depression 
vulnerability are associated with biased recall of sad facial expressions (Gilboa-Schechtman, 
Erhard-Weiss, & Jeczemien, 2002; Jermann, van der Linden, & D'Argembeau, 2008; Ridout, 
Astell, Reid, Glen, & O'Carroll, 2003). Given evidence of memory and interpretive biases, 
cognitive models would predict that mood episodes might influence attentional processing of 
affective facial expressions. Available evidence has supported this prediction. 
 A collection of studies have reported differences when comparing currently depressed, 
formerly depressed, or dysphoric groups to healthy control groups on various aspects of attention 
following presentations of affective facial stimuli. Most reported evidence has indicated that 
depressed individuals engage attention more efficiently and sustain attention for longer with sad 
faces compared to nondepressed individuals (Gotlib, Kasch, et al., 2004; Gotlib, Krasnoperova, 
et al., 2004; Joormann & Gotlib, 2007; Karparova, Kersting, & Suslow, 2005). However, 
research has also suggested that depression is associated with impaired attentional orientation 
with or bias away from positive faces presented at brief latencies (Gotlib, Kasch, et al., 2004; 
Suslow, et al., 2004; Suslow, Junghanns, & Arolt, 2001). The difference in findings appears to be 
a product of which stage of attentional processing is examined by the given research paradigm 
(see Bradley, Mogg, & Millar, 2000 for discussion). Such a dissociation could plausibly emerge 
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given the contemporary understanding that negative faces are detected through automatic parallel 
processing and happy faces are detected via serial, effortful processing (White, 1995). Therefore, 
because depression is characterized by intact automatic processing and impaired effortful 
processing (Hartlage, Alloy, Vazquez, & Dykman, 1993), attention to happy (but not sad) faces 
would be deficient. Also, of particular relevance to the present research, behavioral evidence has 
linked depression to deficient inhibition of sad facial affect (Goeleven, De Raedt, Baert, & 
Koster, 2006).   
Results from groups at risk for depression are relatively consistent with those found with 
currently depressed samples. For example, Joormann and Gotlib (2007) found that at relatively 
long stimulus durations (1000ms), formerly depressed individuals selectively attended to sad 
facial expressions in the absence of any mood manipulation. This study provided evidence of a 
cognitive marker that persists beyond symptomatic recovery from depression, a notable 
exception from the collection of findings consistent with the latent-but-reactive concept (see 
Scher, et al., 2005 for review). Hsieh and Ko (2004) found similar biases in high trait-depressed 
individuals (i.e., more akin to at-risk groups than to groups with major depression) and suggested 
that these individuals might be exhibiting diminished inhibition specific to sad faces. In contrast, 
dysphoric individuals have evinced a tendency to shift initial attention away from happy faces 
relative to neutral faces (Bradley, Mogg, Falla, & Hamilton, 1998; Bradley, et al., 2000) when 
happy-neutral stimuli pairs are presented. Again, this phenomenon could represent a 
depressotypic deficit in orienting attention toward positive interpersonal information. Thus, 
similar to depressed groups, at-risk groups have shown deficient orienting to happy facial 
expressions and greater attentional maintenance with sad facial expressions compared to healthy 
control groups. Also, preliminary findings suggest that distressed depression-susceptible 
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individuals may lack sufficient inhibition of incoming sad facial affect in the social environment. 
Lastly, findings from depression/depression vulnerability studies that have examined attentional 
biases with emotional facial expression stimuli largely parallel studies that have used emotional 
word stimuli. However, while specific inhibition biases have been found for negative distracting 
words in depressed and at-risk groups, research has yet to discern whether a similar result 
emerges with sad facial expression stimuli. In summary, studies using indirect behavioral 
measures of cognition have linked depression vulnerability with biased attentional processing of 
facial affect. 
Increasingly, cognitive neuroscience research techniques have been used to augment 
contemporary knowledge of cognitive processing biases and how they are instantiated in the 
brain. Cognitive neuroscience can uniquely examine mind-brain relationships, drawing 
connections between mental events and neural events. Such “vertical” integration across levels 
of analysis represents a higher-order objective in advancing scientific knowledge (Cosmides, 
Tooby, & Barkow, 1992; Wilson, 1999), in this case moving toward a holistic understanding of 
depressotypic information processing. To this end, behaviors (e.g., reaction times and errors) and 
neural activity (e.g., ERP: event-related potentials components) associated with selective 
attention and inhibition can be concurrently examined in depression-prone groups, with results 
illuminating potential psychological-physiological linkages. 
Neuroelectric Activity Related to Selective Attention/Inhibition and Depression Vulnerability 
Specific neural activity has been related to selective attention, and differences in this 
activity have been found between depressed and healthy individuals via cognitive neuroscience 
techniques. Because orienting, engagement, disengagement, and shifting of attention are events 
that take place on a brief time scale, ERP research, with its precise temporal resolution, is 
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uniquely positioned to help elucidate how attentional processes are instantiated in time within 
particular neurocognitive systems. In terms of the electrophysiological signals associated with 
specific event-related mental processing (i.e., ERP), amplitude of positive or negative deflections 
in the electroencephalogram (EEG) waveform is often examined. Comparing susceptible and 
nonsusceptible individuals with respect to attentional ERP waveform components could shed 
light on depression vulnerability at a neurocognitive level of analysis. 
Selective Attention ERP Components 
ERP waveform components related to aspects of selective attention include the N200 and 
the P300, (including P300a and P300b variants). Based on current understanding, these 
components can be examined to assess attentional activation and inhibition in vulnerable and 
nonvulnerable individuals. In ERP research, these components are reliably evoked by Go/No-go 
and oddball paradigms (Bertoli & Probst, 2005; Debener, Kranczioch, Herrmann, & Engel, 
2002), the latter of which was used in the present investigation. 
The P300 (or P3), the third pronounced positive deflection in the waveform beginning 
roughly 300ms after stimulus onset, has long been an important component with respect to 
studying attentional processes (see Polich, 2007 for thorough review). More recently, the P3 
“complex” has been sub-divided into the P3a and P3b, elements representing functionally 
distinct cognitive operations arising from topographically different brain regions. The P3a is a 
variant of the “novelty P300” potential evoked by novelty oddball tasks, which augment the 
traditional two-category oddball paradigm with a third task-irrelevant distracter category. The 
P3a is elicited by these rarely presented distracters (Debener, et al., 2002; Simons, Graham, 
Miles, & Chen, 2001). The P3a typically occurs between 230-360ms as frontocentrally-generated 
activity that may reflect automatic bottom-up processing aspects of attention, including the 
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orienting response (Debener et al., 2002), and/or top-down processing, as in identifying 
mismatches with a standard stimulus type stored in memory (Polich, 2007). Evidence suggests 
that the P3a is not meaningfully distinguished from the “No-Go P300” (Polich, 2007), a frontally 
located component thought to reflect inhibition of a planned response or conflict between 
competing responses (Bekker, Kenemans, & Verbaten, 2004; Bokura, Yamaguchi, & Kobayashi, 
2001; Bruin, Wijers, & van Staveren, 2001; Fox, Michie, Wynne, & Maybery, 2000; 
Nieuwenhuis, Yeung, van den Wildenberg, & Ridderinkhof, 2003; Smith, Johnstone, & Barry, 
2007). Boys with ADHD and patients with Parkinson’s disease, populations with significant 
behavioral inhibition deficits, have both been found to exhibit diminished No-Go P300s (Bokura, 
Yamaguchi, & Kobayashi, 2005; Fallgatter, et al., 2004). 
On the other hand, the P3b, referred to as the “target P300” in oddball paradigms, is 
typically elicited by the identification of a salient, rarely presented target stimulus. The P3b is a 
temporoparietal-generated activation that occurs between 400-580ms, and it may reflect 
voluntary, top-down related aspects of attention (Debener et al., 2002) and/or bottom-up aspects, 
as in matching a stimulus with a categorical template (Polich, 2007). The amplitude of the P3b is 
also thought to reflect the amount of attentional processing resources allocated to stimulus 
evaluation (Debener, et al., 2002; Rich, et al., 2005). Evidence suggests that P3b is a variant of 
the same potential that manifests as the “Go P300” (Polich, 2007), a potential evoked by the 
selection of a go response in Go/No-Go paradigms (Jonkman, 2006). Pertinent to experimental 
design, P3b amplitude tends to increase with time between target stimuli. Relevant to theoretical 
considerations, Polich (2007) recently proposed that P3a and P3b may represent activity of a 
neural circuit that, upon identifying a rare, salient stimulus, inhibits irrelevant cognition to 
facilitate attentional focus and memory storage (consonant with Donchin’s context-updating 
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model; Donchin & Coles, 1988). 
In addition, an N200, or N2, component (second negative deflection peaking around 
250ms) has been identified which may be related to inhibition (Jodo & Kayama, 1992; 
Johnstone, et al., 2007; Lavric, Pizzagalli, & Forstmeier, 2004), but of late has been linked more 
to conflict monitoring (Bekker et al., 2004; Donkers & van Boxtel, 2004; Jonkman, 2006). It is 
possible this component could be related to both inhibition and conflict monitoring, as No-Go 
N200 amplitudes are smaller than normal in inhibition-deficient Parkinson’s patients (Bokura, et 
al., 2005) and larger than normal in individuals with obsessive compulsive disorder (Ruchsow, 
Reuter, Hermle, Ebert, Kiefer et al., 2007). The latter may reflect greater response conflict or, 
phrased differently, greater cognitive interference. N200 amplitude has been found to be 
positively correlated with the probability of a target stimulus presentation, compared to stimuli to 
be ignored (Bekker, Kenemans, & Verbaten, 2005; Donkers & van Boxtel, 2004). 
Neuroanatomically, the N2 appears to be generated by a region that connects medial frontal and 
anterior cingulate areas (Bekker et al., 2005; Bokura, et al., 2001). Therefore, the P3a, P3b, and 
N2 attributes can help illuminate neural processes that may underlie behaviorally observed 
interference and response inhibition phenomena in psychopathological populations, and possibly 
in individuals who are vulnerable to depression. 
ERP Components and Depression Susceptibility 
Major depression is typically associated with decreased P3 amplitude in response to 
neutral, nonaffective stimuli (e.g., Ancy, Gangadhar, & Janakiramaiah, 1996; Kemp, et al., 
2009), which could be thought to reflect generalized, symptomatic deficits in attention and 
concentration. However, mounting evidence indicates that depressed individuals show normal or 
even elevated P3s in response to negative information on certain cognitive tasks. For example, 
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Ohira (1996) reported general evidence of P3 attenuation among depressed individuals, but also 
a specific lack of P3 attenuation when these individuals were responding to words with a 
negative emotional tone. In a later study, Ilardi, Atchley, Enloe, Kwasny and Garratt (2007) 
found that negative affective stimuli evoked higher amplitude P3s in currently depressed 
individuals than in never depressed controls and formerly depressed individuals.  
The few studies that have examined attentional ERP components in depression-susceptible 
populations have not focused on depressotypic processing biases; however abnormal ERP 
patterns have been reported. For example, subclinically depressed groups have exhibited 
augmented parietal P3s in response to pain-related words in a lexical decision task and different 
asymmetrical activation profiles of the P300 (and N200) on an auditory oddball task when 
compared to healthy control groups (Nikendei, Dengler, Wiedemann, & Pauli, 2005; Sumich, et 
al., 2006). Also, children of parents that experienced childhood depression have shown larger 
amplitude P3s than a control group during a Posner task in which negative affect was induced via 
performance pressure (Perez-Edgar, Fox, Cohn, & Kovacs, 2006). Importantly, this set of 
findings hints at possible psychophysiological parallels between depression and depression-
vulnerability. For example, vulnerable individuals experiencing distress may recruit abnormally 
increased neural resources while selectively attending to mood-relevant information or 
attempting to inhibit “affective interference” during neutral task performance (Siegle et al., 
2002). Simultaneously, these individuals may allocate fewer attentional resources toward 
affectively neutral mental tasks that are nonetheless vital to one’s livelihood and daily 
functioning. As intriguing as these findings are, far more research is needed to understand the 
psychophysiology of various types of information processing in depression-prone groups. 
Research has yet to examine whether or not elevated P3s can be detected in depressed 
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individuals in response to depressive facial expression stimuli, or in negative-schema-activated 
depression-susceptible individuals who do not meet current major depression criteria, in response 
to facial stimuli. However, Cavanagh and Geisler (2006) examined the P3 response of depressed 
and nondepressed students on an oddball task that presented alternating blocks of rare happy and 
fearful target expressions interspersed among standard neutral facial stimuli. The authors 
reported that, compared to the control group, the depressed group showed a reduced mean P3 to 
happy target faces but not fearful ones. Thus, extant P3 findings support the notion that 
depressotypic selective attention processing designates negative information as particularly 
salient and positive information as specifically non-salient. Depression vulnerability may be 
characterized by this same pattern of attention, which could promote extended periods of 
depressive cognition and mood. If this is the case, depression-susceptible groups may exhibit an 
increased P3 when attending to sad facial affect and an attenuated P3 to happy affect. 
By comparison, the N2 has been scarcely studied with regard to depressive biases. One 
study reported that depressed individuals exhibited an attenuated right posterior N2 in reaction to 
mood-incongruent positive faces (Deldin, Keller, Gergen, & Miller, 2000). However this N2 was 
evoked by an affective valence identification task, not a selective attention or inhibition 
paradigm. Nonetheless, ERP research has the potential to help illuminate neural processes that 
underlie depressotypic attentional biases. 
To summarize, behavioral information processing paradigms have provided strong 
evidence that depression and depression vulnerability can be associated with attentional biases 
toward affective facial stimuli. Also, there is mounting evidence that depression can be 
characterized by a specific inhibitory deficit for negative information. However, additional 
research is needed to determine whether depression susceptibility is associated with an inhibitory 
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deficit for sad facial affect. Reduced inhibition when encountering others’ sad affect could give 
rise to prolonged patterns of rumination and perhaps the development and maintenance of 
depressive episodes. Also, abnormal attention to facial affect could potentially modulate other 
forms of depressogenic cognition and social behavior. Specifically, individuals whose attention 
is more focused on others’ expressions of sadness and disappointment may be more likely to 
appraise and recall social interactions as more negative, to blame themselves for others’ negative 
emotions, to criticize their own faults, and to isolate themselves from others (Frewen & Dozois, 
2005; Joiner & Rudd, 1995; Lewinsohn, 1974; Persad & Polivy, 1993). 
Furthermore, the mechanisms, or neural systems, that instantiate attentional biases are 
poorly understood and have been insufficiently studied with tools that can help elucidate 
processing patterns. Cognitive neuroscience can concurrently examine behavioral and 
psychophysiological correlates of attention in depression-prone groups, presenting the valuable 
opportunity to integrate knowledge from psychological and biological levels of analysis. Lastly, 
the question of whether state-, trait-, or state-and-trait-related operationalizations of risk present 
with homogeneous versus differential attention biases remains largely unresolved. Research that 
compares groups representing each of these operationalizations of risk on attentional measures is 
needed. 
The Present Research 
In line with the previously identified empirical questions, the present study examined 
whether individuals from various groups at-risk for developing depression exhibit selective 
attention and inhibition biases for affective facial expressions as compared to low-risk 
individuals. A 2 x 2 x 2 mixed design yielded four sample groups with two levels of dysphoria 
status (nondysphoric vs. dysphoric) and history of depression (past major depression vs. none), 
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enabling comparisons of relative risk across groups and within groups (e.g., control vs. 
experimental task). Double-gated assessments were employed to determine the presence and 
stability of dysphoria and the existence of past major depressive episodes. Rumination and 
present emotional state were also assessed. Qualifying participants completed two visual oddball 
tasks, which elicited and measured behavioral and neuroelectric responses reflecting inhibition 
and activation aspects of selective attention. In the affective experimental task, participants were 
to respond or inhibit a response to infrequently presented sad or happy facial expressions (i.e., 
rare target or distracter) in the context of frequently presented neutral faces. A non-affective 
control oddball condition was also included to clarify whether any found inhibitory deficits 
would be specific to depressive affective information processing. This non-affective task 
required participants to respond only to facial stimuli that fit into one of three age categories. 
Behaviorally, faster reaction times (e.g., Joormann, 2004) or erroneous responses to a particular 
facial affect (i.e., responding to a sad face when instructed to respond only to happy faces) may 
identify a relative inhibitory deficit. Psychophysiologically, attenuated N2 or P3a or elevated P3b 
amplitudes may identify greater interference, inhibition processing, or focused attention. 
Therefore, given that the brain can recruit compensatory neural resources to minimize 
impairment in behavioral performance (Drummond, et al., 2001; Sumich, et al., 2006) depression 
vulnerable individuals’ behavioral performance and neural activity linked to inhibitory 
processing were concurrently measured. 
Because all groups who are susceptible to depression might not be characterized by similar 
attentional processing biases, this study included three vulnerable groups. A key question to be 
assessed was whether behavioral and neuroelectric indicators of cognitive bias are dependent on 
mood-state activation of (i.e., occurring in currently dysphoric groups) or whether trait-but-not-
   
 19 
state vulnerability status (e.g., formerly depressed but currently nondysphoric group) is related to 
biased processing when focusing on emotional content. Therefore, the present study examined 
possible state, trait, and state-trait interactive contributions to information processing. 
Hypotheses 
Based on the reviewed literature, state-by-trait interaction effects were generally predicted 
such that the currently dysphoric formerly depressed group would show evidence of inhibitory 
deficits for sad distracter faces and facilitated processing of sad target faces compared to 
nondysphoric groups. Also, a small collection of findings suggests that currently dysphoric 
formerly depressed individuals would attend less to happy facial affect (e.g., Bradley, et al., 
1998; Bradley, et al., 2000; Karparova, et al., 2005; Nandrino, Dodin, Martin, & Henniaux, 
2004). Therefore, the present study expected that the currently dysphoric formerly depressed 
group would show evidence of reduced selective attention to happy target faces than the low-risk 
nondysphoric never depressed group. More specific predictions are discussed below and 
catalogued in Table 2 and Table 3 in Appendix B.  
Behavioral Indicators of Inhibitory Bias 
For a depression susceptible individual, seeing the sad facial expression of another person 
might activate related depressive self-schemas, which could facilitate further relevant processing 
of depressive content or potentially cause interference when depressive content is irrelevant to 
the task at hand. In the context of a visual oddball paradigm where dysphoric participants are 
either to respond or inhibit responses to presented sad or happy faces, one might expect to see 
behaviorally facilitated responding to sad faces as compared to happy faces. This effect would be 
further pronounced if dysphoric participants were to insufficiently degrade task-irrelevant 
depressive content, as it could persist in working memory, leading to greater interference effects 
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when dysphoric participants must respond to subsequently presented happy faces. Thus, it was 
expected that the dysphoric formerly depressed group would respond more quickly to sad faces 
and more slowly to happy faces compared to nondysphoric never depressed individuals (e.g., 
Siegle, et al., 2002). Also, it was expected that dysphoric formerly depressed individuals would 
exhibit more errors of commission to sad faces when instructed to respond only to happy stimuli.  
Psychophysiological Indicators of Inhibitory Bias 
In terms of ERP analysis, the dysphoric formerly depressed group was predicted to evince a 
significantly higher amplitude P3b for task-appropriate responses to sad faces compared to happy 
faces. This pattern was not expected in the nondysphoric group. It was also predicted that the 
dysphoric formerly depressed group would exhibit a higher amplitude P3b for sad target trials 
compared to the nondysphoric never depressed group. 
Additionally, it was thought that analysis of ERPs in dysphoric individuals might reveal a 
lower amplitude P3a for task-irrelevant sad faces than for task-irrelevant happy faces. This 
would be in line with the previously hypothesized deficit for inhibiting negative information 
during emotion-focused information processing (Joormann, 2004). Similarly, N2 amplitude was 
expected to be lower for task-irrelevant-sad than irrelevant-happy faces among dysphoric 
individuals.  
Indicator of Nonemotional Information Processing 
Consistent with research showing attenuated P3s in depressed individuals, dysphoric 
groups would be expected to exhibit P3b attenuation during the nonemotional oddball task. 
Alternatively, from a cognitive reactivity framework, P3b attenuation would only be expected 
when a diathesis (i.e., trait predisposition) and stress (depressed mood state) are present, in which 
case, only the currently dysphoric, formerly depressed group would show an attenuated P3b. 
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Method 
Participants 
In order to enroll the present qualifying sample, 155 participants were originally recruited. 
Ultimately, 55 qualifying participants met inclusion criteria and provided data that were adequate 
to analyze. Each diagnostic group included 14 participants, with the exception of the dysphoric 
never depressed group, which included 13 (see group characteristics below in Table 1). Groups 
of this size have provided sufficient statistical power to detect between-group differences in 
studies comparing P300 amplitudes of depressed and nondepressed samples (Diner, Holcomb, & 
Dykman, 1985; Murthy, Gangadhar, Janakiramaiah, & Subbakrishna, 1997; Pierson, et al., 1996; 
Torta, Borio, Cicolin, Vighetti, & Ravizza, 1994). 
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Table 1. Descriptive characteristics of the sample 
 Dysphoric 
Formerly 
Depressed 
Dysphoric 
Never 
Depressed  
Nondysphoric 
Formerly 
Depressed 
Nondysphoric 
Never 
Depressed 
All 
Participants 
N 14 13 14 14 55 
Age in years  19.29 (1.20) 19.62 (2.47) 21.79 (7.74) 18.86 (0.86) 19.89 (4.20) 
Female 
 
 
50.00% 
(7) 
61.53% 
(8) 
71.42% 
(10) 
57.14% 
(8) 
60.00% 
(33) 
African American/Black  7.14% 0% 0% 0% 1.82% 
Asian American/Pacific 
Islander 
 
0% 15.40% 0% 0% 3.64% 
Caucasian American/White 92.86% 84.60% 100% 100% 94.54% 
Prescreen BDI-II score  16.43 (7.59) 
 
19.00 (6.15) 3.36 (4.40) 3.93 (5.62) 10.53 (9.25) 
Experimental session BDI-II 17.43 (3.67) 
 
16.31 (4.21) 3.79 (1.93) 2.07 (1.27) 9.78 (7.66) 
Ruminative Response Scale 18.64 (4.91) 17.23 (3.24) 14.86 (5.72) 11.86 (4.37) 15.62 (5.24) 
POMS Tension-Anxiety   5.71 (4.23) 4.54 (2.88) 1.57 (1.22) 1.23 (1.48)+ 3.28 (3.30)++ 
POMS Depression-Dejection 3.85 (2.38)+ 2.15 (2.04) 0.21 (0.58) 0.29 (0.61) 1.57 (2.16)++ 
POMS Anger-Hostility 0.93 (1.27) 1.15 (1.86) 0.00 (0.00)+ 0.21 (0.58) 0.57 (1.22)++ 
POMS Vigor-Activity 5.50 (4.36) 3.85 (3.39) 7.29 (5.20) 6.64 (3.34) 5.85 (4.24) 
POMS Fatigue-Inertia 6.86 (3.13) 6.62 (4.03) 2.57 (2.17) 3.29 (1.98) 4.80 (3.44) 
POMS Confusion-
Bewilderment 
 
4.71 (2.73) 4.77 (1.79) 3.00 (0.78) 2.57 (1.16) 3.75 (1.99) 
+Based on n = 13 due to missing data  
++Based on n = 54 due to missing data  
 
Recruitment. Participants were recruited from a pool of students completing research 
participation for introductory psychology course credit. Potential participants had already 
completed online demographic and psychological prescreening measures and had provided 
contact information. Potential participants who met preliminary eligibility criteria signed up to 
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participate via an online research system, or they were contacted by email or by phone. If they 
were interested in participating, a session was scheduled. To balance any gender effects across 
experimental groups, the proportion of each gender was kept roughly equal in each experimental 
group. 
Inclusion criteria. To qualify, participants needed to be right-handed and have no history of 
neurological disorder or brain insult resulting in loss of consciousness. Also, participants were 
required to meet criteria for one of the following groups: currently dysphoric never depressed, 
currently dysphoric formerly depressed, currently nondysphoric formerly depressed, or currently 
nondysphoric never depressed. The currently dysphoric groups needed to score in the dysphoric 
range (i.e., 12-21) of the Beck Depression Inventory, Second Edition (BDI-II)(Beck, Steer, & 
Brown, 1996) at two time points (the first time point used projected scores from a 7-item short 
form BDI). This range maximized sensitivity to dysphoria, with a slightly elevated ceiling cut-
point justifiable because current major depressive disorder was ruled out. The first time point 
was part of the previously mentioned online collection of measures that participants completed 
several weeks before the experimental session. The second time, in the experimental session, 
participants completed a modified version of the BDI-II (Life Stress Inventory; Hunt, Auriemma, 
& Cashaw, 2003), which includes additional items shown to limit underreporting of depressive 
symptoms. This version was chosen so as not to limit selection bias that can be introduced by 
preferentially enrolling students who more openly endorse depressive symptoms. Scoring in the 
dysphoric range at both time points demonstrated both the stability and presence of dysphoric 
mood in participants at the time of the experiment. To qualify in the nondysphoric never 
depressed group, participants needed to score lower than 7 on the BDI-II at both time points and 
fail to meet DSM-IV criteria for a past or present major depressive episode. 
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To qualify in either of the formerly depressed groups (i.e., with or without current 
dysphoria), participants needed to meet DSM-IV criteria for a past major depressive episode, 
based on an administration of the past mood disorders module of the Structured Clinical 
Interview for DSM-IV (SCID; First, Spitzer, Gibbon, & Williams, 2003). Participants were 
ineligible if they reported a history of mania/hypomania or any current psychiatric or health 
problems that might interfere with research participation. Lastly, participants needed to be at 
least 18 years old to participate in the experiment. 
Experimental Stimuli 
Selection Process 
Ethnically diverse facial stimuli were selected from the NimStim (Tottenham, Tanaka, 
Leon, McCarry, Nurse et al., in press), University of Pennsylvania (Erwin, Gur, Gur, Skolnick, 
Mawhinney-Hee et al., 1992; Gur, Sara, Hagendoorn, Marom, Hughett et al., 2002), Karolinska 
Directed Emotional Faces (Lundqvist, Flyt, & Ohman, 1998) and the Productive Aging 
Laboratory lifespan (Minear & Park, 2004) sets. Relatively unambiguous stimuli were pre-
selected to minimize group interpretation differences. For the non-affective age group 
identification control task, each stimulus face falls into one of three age groupings of adults 
(younger: 18-25; middle: 40-60, older: 75-95). For the experimental task, piloting was conducted 
to select groups of faces that were consistently identified as falling in one of three affect groups 
(e.g., sad, happy, neutral), irrespective of dysphoria status or history of depression. In the 
piloting procedure, 417 facial stimuli were presented over four blocks to five participants 
representing each of the four cells of the previously described 2 x 2 design (current dysphoria 
status by past depression status). For any given stimulus to be incorporated into the experimental 
task set, it had to be coded accurately (i.e., consistent with established norms of the sets) at a rate 
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of at least 60% by each of the four groups (as in Hsieh & Ko, 2004), and its accuracy rate could 
not be significantly different based on dysphoria status, past depression status or an interaction of 
the two. Therefore, stimuli that met the minimum accuracy threshold were subjected to 2 x 2 
analyses of variance, with dysphoria status and past depression status as independent variables 
and accuracy as the dependent variable. Because the small sample cells provided relatively weak 
power to detect between-group differences, stimuli indicating a difference, using a stringent 
alpha level of .15, were eliminated. From these procedures 60 happy, 60 neutral, and 60 sad 
qualifying facial expression stimuli were selected for the two affective valence identification task 
blocks (30 of each category per block). Therefore, happy and sad faces, whether presented as 
targets or distracters, were always novel to a participant completing the oddball tasks. 
Task-Relevant Characteristics 
The final set of stimuli was sufficiently large enough to enable each target and distracter 
stimulus to be presented only once during the oddball tasks so that behavioral and physiological, 
measures derived from single (i.e., non-repeating) exposures to novel stimuli. Also, each set 
included sad, happy, and neutral expressions of the same actors. This controlled for level of 
attractiveness and other physical features extraneous to affect-related expression changes. Each 
of the four task blocks consisted of 30 target, 30 distracter, and 240 standard stimuli. Within each 
block, gender of depicted actors was balanced. The task blocks were administered in such an 
order that affective blocks alternated with non-affective age-related blocks (i.e., target = happy, 
older, sad, younger). The decision of which ordering permutations to use for each participant 
came from a pre-determined block design that minimized any order or fatigue effects and 
distributed them equally across the four risk groups. Also, two affective stimuli sets—each 
including 30 unique happy and 30 unique sad facial expressions—were incorporated in the 
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aforementioned block design so that each affective stimulus was equally likely to appear as a 
target or a distracter for participants in each of the four diagnostic groups (see Appendix A). 
Within each oddball task block the ordering of stimulus presentations was pseudo-random with 
overall proportions of 80% standard stimuli, 10% rare targets and 10% rare distracters. 
Experimental Procedure 
Prior to arriving to participate, study participants had completed an online prescreen 
including short form measures assessing current dysphoria and past depression. The participant’s 
responses on these measures were a preliminary indication of potential qualification into one of 
the four recruitment cells described earlier. Participants came in for a single experimental 
session. Upon arriving, participants were asked to provide informed consent to participate. 
Participants needed to meet eligibility criteria or they were debriefed and released. They 
completed measures of dysphoria (BDI-II), rumination (Response Styles Questionnaire; 
RSQ)(Nolen-Hoeksema, et al., 1993), and a clinician administered assessment of past or present 
depression (SCID). Qualifying participants were then fitted with an ERP net and were seated in 
front of a computer monitor in a sound-attenuated room. They were instructed to remain still 
during the experiment and used a chinrest to hold their head steady, 41.9 cm from the monitor. 
Next, participants completed experimental and control visual oddball tasks with 
instructions to keep their eyes fixated on the cross in the middle of the screen during the 
experiment. For the oddball tasks, participants were instructed to respond as quickly as possible 
to rarely presented target stimuli and ignore rarely presented distracter stimuli in the context of 
frequently presented stimuli of a third type. Each of these task conditions was preceded by a 
short practice block to familiarize participants with the task. On practice blocks, the computer 
program provided feedback (e.g., “correct” or “incorrect”) based on the participant’s response. 
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During the task, a fixation cross appeared for 250ms. Each stimulus was presented in the center 
of the screen for 750 ms and was replaced by a mask for 1000ms. Each task block lasted 
approximately 11 minutes, and participants were given short breaks between the four blocks.  
In the experimental condition blocks, the rare stimuli were happy and sad facial 
expressions, and the frequently presented stimuli were affectively neutral faces. Each participant 
completed one block where happy faces were targets and one where sad faces were targets. Each 
participant also completed two nonaffective control oddball condition blocks in which the rare 
stimuli were younger and older faces, while frequently presented stimuli were “middle” in age. 
Within each block, stimuli were presented pseudo-randomly so that rare targets were separated 
by between 4-16 non-target stimuli to maximize P3b responses to target stimuli (see Polich, 2007 
review for discussion of probability and timing effects on P3). Also, in order to minimize 
lateralized pre-motor ERPs associated with button presses, laterality of response hand was 
counterbalanced across participants (see Appendix A). 
Measures 
Beck Depression Inventory, Second Edition (see Appendix C). The BDI-II (Beck, Steer, & 
Brown, 1996) is the most recent version of the BDI, a widely used self-report depression 
instrument with considerable reliability and validity data to support its use. Although the content 
of the 21 BDI-II items was updated to correspond with DSM-IV depression criteria, and total 
BDI-II scores tend to be significantly higher (i.e., by about 2 points) than BDI scores, 
psychometric properties of the two measures are very similar. As such, the BDI-II has 
demonstrated robust internal consistency, and its items correlate highly with BDI items that 
assess the same underlying symptoms (e.g., sadness, pessimism, indecisiveness) (Beck, Steer, 
Ball, & Ranieri, 1996; Dozois & Dobson, 1998). Likewise, the BDI-II has demonstrated a high 
   
 28 
degree of convergent validity with other depression measures, but less impressive discriminative 
validity. That is, the BDI and BDI-II are sensitive measures of syndrome depression, but they are 
not specific to depression (Beck, Steer, Ball, & Ranieri, 1996; Kendall & Flannery-Schroeder, 
1995). For example, aggregated high scores on the BDI and BDI-II are to a lesser extent 
correlated with anxiety. It has been proposed that the BDI is truly measuring dysphoria (Beck, 
Steer, & Garbin, 1988), which is a core element of depression (Frank et al., 1992; Ingram & 
Wisnicki, 1999). Thus, by extension, the BDI-II is also measuring dysphoria. Scores on the BDI-
II can range from 0-63, with scores between 13 and 19 indicating dysphoria, and scores between 
20 and 63 indicating depression (Dozois & Dobson, 1998). 
 Life Stress Inventory (see Appendix D). The Life Stress Inventory (LSI) is a modified 
“covert” version of the BDI-II that was created to examine whether socially desirable responding 
leads to underreporting of depressive symptoms (Hunt, et al., 2003). The LSI includes 14 
additional items about relatively socially-benign stressors (e.g. “traffic often irritates me). Hunt 
and colleagues (2003) found that average sum scores from BDI-II items were three points higher 
on the covert LSI version than on an overt version (which included 14 additional items from the 
Zung Self-Rating Scale for Depression), suggesting that underreporting was curbed by the 
measure that evoked less fear of stigmatization. 
Ruminative Response Scale (RRS; see Appendix E). The RRS is a self-report scale within 
the commonly used Response Styles Questionnaire (Nolen-Hoeksema, et al., 1993). The short 
form utilized in this study consisted of 8 factor-analyzed items that remained after items referring 
overtly to depressive symptoms were removed (e.g., Roberts, Gilboa, & Gotlib, 1998). Five 
items load onto an introspection/self-isolation factor, while the other three items load onto a self-
blame factor. Each item lists a possible response to a sad mood state and asks the respondent 
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how frequently he or she acts this way. Item responses on the four-point Likert scale range from 
“almost never” to “almost always.” Scores on the short form can range from 0-24. The complete 
21-item version of the RRS has demonstrated adequate internal consistency (Nolen-Hoeksema & 
Morrow, 1991), reliability, and validity (Roelofs, Muris, Huibers, Peeters, & Arntz, 2006). For 
example, participants’ RRS scores have been shown to correlate strongly with their use of 
ruminative responses to depressed moods in a 30-day diary (Nolen-Hoeksema, Morrow, & 
Fredrickson, 1990). 
Profile of Mood States-Brief (POMS-B; see Appendix F). The POMS-B is a 30-item short 
form that is commonly used in medical settings to track short-term mood changes in patients. 
The POMS-B consists of the five original POMS items that load highest on the six mood factors 
derived from factor analyses (McNair, Loor, & Droppleman, 1992). Mood factors include 
tension-anxiety, depression, anger-hostility, vigor-activity, fatigue, and confusion-bewilderment. 
Items are rated on a five-point Likert scale (0-4) from “not at all” to “extremely.” Items are 
summed into their appropriate POMS-BF factor scores, which range from 0-20. The POMS-B 
has demonstrated reliability and validity as a sensitive instrument to short-term mood changes 
(Yeun & Shin-Park, 2006). Also, POMS subscales such as tension-anxiety, depression, and 
anger-hostility have been found to correlate with emotion-typical changes in physiology 
(Pollock, Cho, Reker, & Volavka, 1979). 
The Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV-I, Non-patient Edition (SCID-I/NP; see 
Appendix G). The SCID-I/NP is a semi-structured interview used (First, Spitzer, Gibbon, & 
Williams, 2002) to make DSM-IV-TR diagnoses (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). The 
SCID consists of modules, which correspond with DSM-IV axes and classes of disorders. Each 
module is constructed as a schematic algorithm that leads to a diagnostic conclusion, based upon 
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the examinee’s reporting and the clinician’s judgment. As noted earlier, the SCID was used 
chiefly to assess for current and past mood episodes. Therefore, only the unipolar and bipolar 
depression modules of the SCID-I/NP were administered. The depression portion of the SCID 
has been shown to be reliable (Zanarini & Frankenburg, 2001; Zanarini, et al., 2000). 
Collecting and Cleaning Oddball Task Data 
Behavioral Data 
 The visual oddball tasks were created with E-prime (Psychology Software Tools), which 
enables the precise measurement of reaction times and recording of correct and incorrect 
responses for later analysis. The tasks were presented on a Dell Dimension 8300 PC. 
With respect to response accuracy, participants needed to respond correctly to target stimuli 
considerably better than chance (60% correct) to be included in later analyses. This criterion was 
met by all participants who completed the affect identification tasks. For the reaction time 
analyses, only correct trials with response latencies between 100-1750 ms were included 
(participants only had a 2000ms inter-stimulus interval) to eliminate irrelevant outlying 
responses. This resulted in the removal of only 1 target trial, or .02% of target trials overall. 
Electrophysiological Data 
In line with a study by O’Hare (2007), EEG data were collected using a high-density, 128-
channel Electrical Geodesics, Inc. system with Geodesic Sensor Nets, version 2.1. Electrodes 
were placed above and below the left eye and at the outer canthi to monitor blinks and eye 
movements (electro-oculogram; EOG). Electrode impedances were measured using a criterion of 
50k ohms, per manufacturer guidelines. Data were recorded with bandpass cutoffs of .1 to 100 
Hz, digitized online with a sampling rate of 250 Hz. Prior to segmentation, EEG data were 
filtered using a 30 Hz lowpass filter. EEG waveforms were time-locked to each stimulus onset, 
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beginning 200 ms before the stimulus onset and 1000 ms after stimulus onset. A baseline 
correction was applied to the 200 ms period before stimulus onset. An average reference 
transform was applied to estimate reference-independent ERP waveforms (Bertrand, Perrin, & 
Pernier, 1985; Dien, 1998a). 
 Eye blinks and movement artifacts were eliminated with an automatic independent 
components analysis (ICA) script using EEGLAB (Delorme & Makeig, 2004). Electrode 
channels were marked as “bad” for any trial if the fast average amplitude exceeded 200 μv, if the 
differential average amplitude exceeded 100 μv, or the channel lacked variance. A trial was 
identified as bad if it included more than 12 bad channels or had EOG activity (eye movement 
artifacts) in excess of 70 μv even after the ICA routine had removed related variance. A channel 
was identified as bad across the whole session if it was documented to be bad in more than 25% 
of the trials. Bad channels were interpolated from nearby channels by using spherical splines. 
The described automated criteria were supplemented by visual analysis and editing. Per common 
convention, data from a participant was excluded from analyses if 60% or more of the trials in 
any block were marked bad. This resulted in the elimination of 6 participants from analyses. 
Data Analyses 
The first step of the analysis was to examine the collected data, checking for outliers, and 
ascertaining whether assumptions were met for appropriate statistical tests. Tests were conducted 
to ensure that experimental groups were roughly equivalent on appropriate baseline variables 
(e.g., age, gender, ethnicity). For any significant difference found, the variable in question was 
statistically controlled in subsequent analyses as a covariate and considered in interpretation of 
analyses. 
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Behavioral Analyses 
Response accuracy scores were examined to ensure engaged task performance as well as to 
rule out differential difficulty between the experimental and control tasks (task type) or within 
the experimental tasks (i.e. detection of sad versus happy targets). Thus, a 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 mixed 
ANOVA with gender, dysphoria status, depression history and task type as independent variables 
was conducted on response accuracy; a subsequent analysis substituted task type for valence as 
the within-subjects independent variable. Also, to examine affective response inhibition, errors 
of commission to sad distracters were compared across groups. 
Reaction time data for analysis consisted of the median reaction times for each condition 
block (e.g. target: sad; target: happy; target: older; target: younger) for each participant. To 
account for any non-condition-specific effects, a preliminary 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA with gender, 
dysphoria status, and depression history as independent variables was conducted on reaction 
times collapsed across all four condition blocks. Next, to examine general emotional versus 
nonemotional processing in the various groups, task was included as an additional within-
subjects variable (i.e., affect vs. age evaluation). Following these preliminary analyses, valence 
(happy vs. sad) was substituted for task as a within-subjects factor in the 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA. 
Finally, an exploratory ANOVA was used to examine possible links between reaction time and 
error of commission (responses to distracters) findings. 
ERP Analyses 
As with all subsequent ERP component analyses, mean voltage was evaluated as a 
dependent variable across the temporal window and spatial location appropriate to each 
component.  
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Identifying and assessing ERP components. To isolate the primary ERP components 
associated with attention to emotional facial expressions, two analytic techniques were used. 
First, to examine the typically robust “P3 complex”, a traditional windowed analysis was 
conducted on individual average files. A priori, the time window of 350-650 ms was selected, 
and the spatial cluster encircling and including electrode 62 (roughly corresponding with a Pz 
location on a low-density EEG net) was selected for analysis. To examine the N2 component, the 
210-330 ms temporal window and the spatial cluster centering on electrode 11 (also including 4, 
5, 6, 12, 20) were selected. ANOVA was used to determine whether the general P3 or N2 
components were robust enough for between-groups comparisons. 
Additionally, to isolate the N2, P3a, and P3b components, a temporal-spatial principal 
components analysis (PCA) was conducted using the Matlab ERP PCA Toolbox 1.093. Voltage 
readings at each of the time points served as variables for the initial temporal PCA, which 
utilized promax rotation. The scree plot from this PCA suggested 6 temporal components be 
kept, accounting for 94.91%. A follow-up spatial Infomax independent components analysis 
(ICA) was conducted on each temporal component score to differentiate them (Dien, Spencer, & 
Donchin, 2003; Spencer, Dien, & Donchin, 1999), employing the script from EEGlab (Delorme 
& Makeig, 2004). This ICA suggested 8 spatial components and accounted for 72.66% of the 
variance. Combined the temporo-spatial PCA divided the data into 48 factors. Each factor was 
displayed on a net layout for visual inspection, and factors fitting a clear characteristic eye 
movement profile were removed from further analysis. This resulted in the elimination of 32 
factors, leaving 16 remaining factors at that point. Next, it was necessary to match found factors 
to the documented spatial locations of the three ERP components of interest or to discard non-
matching factors. The N200 was expected to derive from frontal electrode sites around 210–330 
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ms following distracter stimuli; the P300a from frontal and frontocentral sites 250-400 ms after 
distracter stimuli; and P300b from parietal and centroparietal sites 350-650 ms after target 
stimuli. Only 6 temporo-spatial factors fit broad spatial criteria of the ERP components of 
interest. The proportion of the grand average accounted for by each factor was reconstructed for 
interpretation and analysis (Dien, Tucker, Potts, & Hartry-Speiser, 1997). 
For each participant, the P3(b) value consisted of the mean amplitude from standard trials 
subtracted from mean amplitude of target trials. The P3a value derived from subtracting standard 
trials from distracter trials. The N2 value derived from subtracting target trials from distracter 
trials. To be considered valid, each proposed component value’s sign (+/-) needed to match its 
archetypal component’s sign and to show significantly different values in appropriate trial 
contrast values. For instance, a P3b candidate factor needed to show significantly greater positive 
mean amplitude on target trials than standard trials. Thus, for each of the 6 factors, ANOVA and 
a Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons were used, with an adjusted alpha of .008 (i.e., 
.05/6 factors). 
 ERP comparisons based on risk factors. To account for any between-groups non-
condition-specific effects, a preliminary 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA with gender, dysphoria status, and 
depression history as independent variables was conducted on targeted ERP components 
collapsed across all four condition blocks. After this, to examine general emotional versus 
nonemotional processing in the various groups, task (affect vs. age evaluation) was included as 
an additional within-subjects variable.  
Planned analyses utilized two theory-driven approaches. First, a set of specific a priori 
between-groups contrasts were tested based on the assumptions that currently dysphoric formerly 
depressed group represents highest risk, and that the nondysphoric never depressed group 
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represents lowest risk. These contrasts (listed in the Table 2 and Table 3 of Appendix B) are 
theoretically linked by a common inhibitory process (hypotheses 1 & 5), a common mechanism 
of facilitated engagement with negative information (hypothesis 2 & 6), a common mechanism 
of attenuated orientation to positive information (hypothesis 3 & 6), and a common attenuation 
of nonaffective target-related activation (hypothesis 4). Secondly, the possibly differentiable and 
interacting effects on ERPs of dysphoria, depression history, and gender were explored via 
ANOVA. To start, a 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA, with valence as a within-subjects variable and 
depression history, dysphoria status, and gender as between-subjects variables was conducted for 
ERP components of interest. Next, valence was removed from the ANOVA, and a 2 x 2 x 2 was 
conducted directly on specific ERP components of interest (e.g., sad P3).  
Results 
Self-Report Measures 
Demographic measures 
 Analysis of variance indicated that age did not vary significantly on the basis of 
dysphoria status, depression history, gender, or any interaction among these variables. Regarding 
gender, the four subgroups ranged between 50-71% female. Despite these relative differences, a 
Pearson chi-square analysis indicated that females were not significantly more likely to be 
included in any one of the four recruited groups (dysphoria status x depression history) than the 
others (all p > .24). Nonetheless, gender was included in analyses to examine potential gender 
effects. With respect to racial status endorsed, each of the four groups was predominantly 
Caucasian, with only three non-Caucasian participants. No qualifying participants self-identified 
as Hispanic/Latino, Native American, or multiracial. Fisher’s exact tests indicated that no racial 
group was preferentially more likely to be included in any one the four recruited groups (all p ≥ 
   
 36 
.50).  
Dysphoria 
The dysphoric groups’ mean experimental BDI-II score for the preceding two weeks did 
not differ significantly from their mean prescreen BDI-II score (see Table 1 for group means), 
supporting a moderate degree of stability across the intervening time period (M = 45.70 days, SD 
= 27.56). The level of BDI-II dysphoria endorsed did not significantly differ between the 
dysphoric formerly depressed group and the dysphoric never depressed group. Level of 
dysphoria also did not differ between the nondysphoric subgroups. No main or interaction effect 
of gender was found for BDI-II dysphoria. 
Rumination 
A significant main effect of dysphoria status was found, F (1, 48) = 12.10, p =.001, with 
dysphoria associated with greater rumination (see dysphoric group means in Table 1). A 
nonsignificant trend was found for depression history, F (1, 48) = 3.23, p = .08, such that past 
depression status was linked to marginally greater levels of rumination.  
Present Mood State 
Immediately before completing information processing tasks, dysphoric participants 
endorsed on the POMS significantly higher levels of tension-anxiety, depression, anger-hostility, 
fatigue, and confusion-bewilderment than nondysphoric participants (all p < .005). Dysphoria 
was also associated with lower vigor-activity subscale scores, F (1, 47) = 4.02, p =.05. Currently 
dysphoric never depressed males endorsed the lowest vigor-activity levels (M = 2.80, SD = 
2.39). In addition, depression history by dysphoria status interaction trend was found for the 
POMS depression subscale, F (1, 48) = 3.55, p = .07. No main or interaction effect of gender 
was found for any POMS subscales. 
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Oddball Task Accuracy 
Preliminary Analyses 
 Was response accuracy acceptable and consistent across response types for all groups? 
The overall accuracy across oddball task conditions was 97.18% (2.11%). In accordance, rare 
target responses (M = 91.50%, SD = 5.67%) and distracter non-responses (M = 98.71%, SD = 
1.29%) also exhibited robust accuracies. Interestingly, accuracy for frequent standard stimuli (M 
= 97.41%, SD = 2.43) was lower than for distracters with a statistically significant, though 
relatively small, difference, F (1, 47) = 17.45, p < .001. Accuracy across response types did not 
vary based on gender and other risk variables. 
Were risk variables associated with accuracy differences based on emotional valence of 
target stimuli? Consistent with pilot data selection procedures, accuracy for specific sad and 
happy targets did not vary based on gender, dysphoria status, depression history or interactions 
among these variables. 
Planned Analysis 
Were risk variables associated with increased inhibitory failures (errors of commission) for 
sad distracter faces? First, a significant main effect of affective task order needed to be 
controlled for first, F = (1, 38) = 4.81, p = .03. Consistent with predictable perseveration 
mistakes (i.e., correctly responding to a type of affect in one block, then incorrectly failing to 
inhibit a response to the same affect in a later block), more errors of commission to sad 
distracters occurred in happy target blocks that followed sad target blocks (M = 0.81, SD = 0.86) 
than vice versa (M = 0.35, SD = 0.71). Controlling for affective task order, a significant effect of 
dysphoria on commission errors was observed among females, but not males (notably, level of 
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dysphoria did not differ between dysphoric females and males, t (25) = .62, p =. 54). 
Specifically, dysphoric females committed more errors (M = 0.87, SD = 0.92) than nondysphoric 
females (M = 0.28, SD = 0.57) when presented sad distracter faces, F = (1, 25) = 5.46, p =.03. 
Although this difference only emerged in females, it appears consistent with a depressive 
emotion-specific inhibitory deficit. Based on the pilot study in which errors rarely involved a 
polar switch in affect appraisal (e.g., from sad to happy), these errors likely reflect inhibition 
failures to task-irrelevant sad faces. Further support is reported with reaction time results. 
Oddball Task Reaction Time 
Preliminary Analyses 
Did general reaction time vary based on gender and other risk variables? When collapsing 
across task variable levels (younger, older, happy, sad targets), a trend gender by dysphoria 
status by depression history interaction, F (1, 40) = 3.03, p = .09, was found. This interaction 
was further examined, revealing three significant simple main effects. Never depressed currently 
dysphoric males exhibited slower reaction times (M = 673.73 ms, SD = 28.38) than formerly 
depressed currently dysphoric males (M = 540.34 ms, SD = 33.57), F (1, 40) = 9.21, p = .004, 
never depressed nondysphoric males (M = 562.80 ms, SD = 25.38), F (1, 40) = 8.49, p = .006, 
and never depressed currently dysphoric females (M = 569.21 ms, SD = 21.98), F (1, 40) = 8.48, 
p = .006.  
Notably, the never depressed currently dysphoric group included only five participants, and 
the increased reaction times across all tasks were particularly influenced by two of these 
participants. However, these two participants’ reaction time values were within three standard 
deviations of the full sample mean, indicating they did not meet a commonly accepted criterion 
to be considered outliers. Moreover, all five participants showed relatively greater mean reaction 
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times than the other seven subgroup means, implying the effect was not merely driven by 
outlying values. No other subgroup contrasts were significantly different. 
Were risk variables associated with different reaction times for emotional information 
versus nonemotional information? The within-subjects variable of task type (emotional 
identification vs. age identification) showed no significant main effects or interactions with 
gender, dysphoria status, or depression history. 
Planned Analyses 
 Were risk variables associated with reaction time differences based on emotional 
valence? Differences found were directly consistent with the general gender by depression 
history by dysphoria interaction reported earlier, with never depressed currently dysphoric 
individuals exhibiting significantly slowed reaction times for sad and happy targets. No other 
between-subgroup contrasts or within-subject contrasts (e.g., sad versus happy valence) were 
significantly different. 
Exploratory Analyses 
 For dysphoric females, was reaction time on sad errors of commission shorter than for 
correct affective targets? Further indicating emotion-specific disinhibition (or impulsivity), 
dysphoric females’ reaction times on sad distracter errors of commission (M = 531.89 ms, 52.28) 
were relatively faster than their correct responses to sad targets (M = 562.98, SD = 46.51) and 
happy targets (M = 601.63 ms, SD = 80.18). The latter difference approached statistical 
significance, F(1, 8) = 4.61, p = .06. 
Oddball Task Event-Related Potentials 
Preliminary Analyses 
Were ERP components of interest reliably found? Some ERP components were reliably 
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measured and analyzed, while others were not. Windowed and PCA-derived data identified what 
is consistent with a P3b (or the P3 complex of components). With windowed data, a 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 
mixed ANOVA was conducted with dysphoria status, depression history, and gender as between-
subjects variables and P3 as a within-subjects variable (amplitude to rare targets [M = 7.61 µV, 
SD = 3.69] versus frequent standards [M = 2.96µV, SD = 2.14]) revealed a significant main 
effect of the P3 component, 96.80, p < .001, collapsing across task types (see Figure 1). Also, 
two unique parietally-located PCA factors that were positively responsive to rare targets 
compared to frequent standard stimuli were found. These will be referred to as P3 Factor 1, F (1, 
47) = 61.11, p < .001, and P3 Factor 2, F (1, 47) = 15.25, p < .001. With respect to the P3a, 
neither windowed nor PCA-derived data in the present sample produced what could be 
considered a valid, significant component. Regarding the N2, windowed analyses revealed a 
significant frontal negative deflection in the appropriate temporo-spatial region (see Figure 2 
below), F (1, 47) = 6.60, p = .01. Also, a frontally-located PCA factor that was negatively 
responsive to rare distracters compared to rare targets was found, F = (1, 47) = 23.91, p < .001. 
This PCA factor may be consistent with the inhibitory N2. However, the N2 was not found to 
vary significantly with respect to any risk variables of interest. 
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Figure 1. Oddball P3 effect in waveform profile and scalp topography 
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A clear P3 effect is demonstrated by the subtraction of the mean amplitude to standard stimuli from task-relevant 
target stimuli, revealing a significantly larger response to the latter. Pre-selected P3 range was 350-650 ms in 
parietal scalp topography. As seen in graph and net layout on a head, data supported this temporo-spatial location. 
 
Figure 2. N2 effect in waveform profile 
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A small N2 effect is demonstrated by the subtraction of the mean amplitude to rare target stimuli from task-
irrelevant distracter stimuli, revealing a larger negative deflection of the waveform to the latter. Pre-selected N2 
range was 210-330 ms in frontal midline scalp topography. 
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Did P3b amplitude vary based on gender and other risk variables? The analyses revealed a 
significant gender by dysphoria effect, F (1, 47) = 3.92, p = .05, on average P3 amplitude, 
collapsing across all task conditions. In particular, dysphoric males showed greater P3s (M = 
6.15µV, SD = 3.61) than dysphoric females (M = 3.45µV, SD = 3.47), F (1, 47) = 4.27, p = .04. 
This effect was most pronounced for the nonemotional age identification tasks, F (1, 48) = 8.99, 
p =.004 and was not statistically significant for the emotion identification blocks. As a result of 
these preliminary analyses, planned analyses incorporated gender as an additional risk variable. 
Also, where appropriate, follow up tests were performed separately for females and males. 
Similarly, due to dysphoria status’s apparent influence on nonemotional processing and predicted 
influence on emotional processing, dysphoria was examined both as a grouping and continuous 
(i.e., total BDI-II score) variable for comparison purposes.  
Were past depression or current dysphoria associated with different P3 amplitude for 
general emotional information? Neither past depression nor current dysphoria were associated 
with increased or decreased mean P3 amplitude for emotional targets compared to nonemotional 
targets. However, a main effect of emotionality was found, F (1, 47) = 19.06 < .001, such that 
across all groups, target P3s in the emotion identification blocks (M = 5.79 µV, SD = 3.93) were 
greater than in the age identification blocks (M = 3.68 µV, SD = 3.80).  
Planned Analyses 
Were specific predictions supported? The windowed analysis indicated that the dysphoric 
formerly depressed group showed a greater P3 amplitude for sad target trials (M = 7.80, SD = 
3.82) than the nondysphoric never depressed group (M = 4.61 µV, SD = 3.73), t (26) = 2.23, p = 
.04 (see Figure 3 below). However, significant between groups differences did not emerge with 
P3 factors 1 and 2. Also, as expected, the dysphoric formerly depressed group exhibited greater 
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P3 amplitude for sad targets than for happy targets (M = 4.76 µV, SD = 4.13), F = (1, 13) = 7.33, 
p = .02 (see Figure 3). A significant valence effect did not occur in the other three subgroups. 
Counter to predictions, the dysphoric formerly depressed and the nondysphoric never depressed 
groups did not differ significantly in their P3 response to happy targets or targets from the age 
identification tasks. 
 
Figure 3. Mean group ERP response to sad targets based on risk contrast 
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The dysphoric formerly depressed group showed a greater mean P3 response to sad targets than the 
nondysphoric never depressed group. P3 range was 350-650 ms in central-parietal scalp topography. The P3 
was calculated by subtracting responses to neutral standard stimuli from responses to sad target stimuli. 
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Figure 4. Mean ERP response to targets based on valence 
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The dysphoric formerly depressed group showed a greater mean P3 response to sad targets than to happy 
targets. The P3 was calculated by subtracting responses to neutral standard stimuli from responses to sad target 
stimuli. 
Were there risk variable P3 main effects or interactions based on emotional valence? A 2 x 
2 x 2 x 2 mixed ANOVA with dysphoria status, depression history, gender, and valence revealed 
a trend main effect of depression history, F (1, 47) = 3.69, p = .06. However, when dysphoria 
was allowed to covary as a continuous variable (i.e., total BDI-II score), the main effect of 
depression history became statistically significant, F (1, 47) = 3.95, p = .05. As represented in 
Figure 5, past depression was linked to increased P3 amplitude for sad targets and diminished P3 
amplitude for happy targets, relative to the never depressed condition. Across the sample, this 
sad-happy P3 difference variable correlated weakly with endorsed rumination, not quite reaching 
statistical significance, r (n=55) = .25, p = .07.  Follow up tests examined processing of sad and 
happy targets independently. 
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Figure 5. Mean group ERP response to valent targets based on depression history 
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History of depression was associated with greater P3 response to sad targets than happy targets. No such effect 
associated with lack of depression history. P3 range was 350-650 ms in central-parietal scalp topography. The 
P3 was calculated by subtracting responses to neutral standard stimuli from responses to sad target stimuli. 
 
Were there risk variable P3 main effects or interactions for sad target faces? Yes.   
In windowed analyses, a dysphoria status by depression history 2 x 2 ANOVA revealed a main 
effect of past depression, F (1, 51) = 5.30, p =.03. Past depression was associated with greater 
P3s (M = 6.96 µV, SD = 3.89) than no history of depression (M = 4.56 µV, SD = 3.79). 
Importantly, even among nondysphoric participants, the history of depression contrast effect was 
observed. With gender as an additional independent variable, a significant three-way gender by 
dysphoria by depression history interaction emerged, F (1, 47) = 5.98, p = .02. Examining gender 
groups separately, females showed a depression history main effect, F (1, 32) = 4.29, p = .05, 
while males exhibited a dysphoria by depression interaction, F (1, 21) = 4.74, p = .04. Formerly 
depressed women displayed greater P3 amplitude (M = 6.54 µV, SD = 3.59) than never 
depressed women (M = 3.92 µV, SD = 3.13) following sad target faces (see Figure 6). This result 
was corroborated by a parallel effect for P3 factor 1 from the PCA, F(1, 47) = 4.66, p = .04 in 
women.  
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Figure 6. Mean female ERP responses to sad targets based on history of depression 
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Formerly depressed females showed a greater mean P3 response to sad targets than never depressed females. The P3 
was calculated by subtracting responses to neutral standard stimuli from responses to sad target stimuli. 
 
In males, the dual risk (currently dysphoric formerly depressed) group showed greater P3 
amplitude (M = 9.84 µV, SD = 1.40) than both the nondysphoric formerly depressed group (M = 
3.69 µV, SD = 1.85), F (1, 47) = 7.03, p = .01, and the currently dysphoric never depressed 
group (M = 4.59µV, SD = 1.66), F (1, 47) = 5.86, p = .02, for sad faces (see Figure 7). 
Evaluating P3 factor 2 from the PCA revealed a parallel result with formerly depressed currently 
dysphoric males showing a greater P3 than never depressed currently dysphoric males, F(1, 47) = 
3.95, p = 05. Notably, previous depression and current dysphoria status on their own did not 
differentiate groups from the low-risk status (nondysphoric never depressed) males in terms of 
P3 mean amplitude. Also, consistent with findings for the gender-undifferentiated sample, dual-
risk males showed relatively greater sad P3 mean amplitude (M = 9.84 µV, SD = 3.16) than the 
nondysphoric never depressed group (M = 6.21 µV, SD = 5.18). However, this difference only 
approached a statistical trend, t (11) = 1.55, p = .15. 
 
   
 47 
Figure 7. Mean male subgroup ERP responses to sad targets 
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Two graphs are shown. The graph on the left displays mean EEG amplitude in response to sad target stimuli. In the 
graph on the right, P3 values (i.e., responses to sad targets – responses to neutral standard stimuli) are plotted. 
Among males, the dysphoric formerly depressed group showed a greater mean P3 response to sad targets than the 
three other subgroups. These effects are more evident in the graph on the right. P3 range was 350-650 ms in central-
parietal scalp topography. 
 
Were risk variables associated with diminished P3 amplitude for happy target faces? In 
windowed and PCA factor analyses, P3 amplitude for happy targets did not significantly vary 
based on dysphoria, depression history, or gender. 
Discussion 
The present study examined relationships between depression-relevant facial affect 
processing and risk for depression. A well-established literature has linked negative attentional 
biases to major depression and recent empirical efforts have increasingly focused on depressive 
processing of interpersonal facial emotion (Gotlib, Kasch, et al., 2004; Gotlib, Krasnoperova, et 
al., 2004; Joormann & Gotlib, 2007; Karparova, et al., 2005). Accumulating evidence indicates 
that cognitive biases similar to those found in depressed groups can be also found in groups at 
risk for developing depression (Ingram, Steidtmann, & Bistricky, 2008). However, the present 
study is the first to examine behavioral and neurophysiological measures of selective attention to 
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depression-relevant facial affect in multiple at-risk groups. Moreover, this study investigated 
potential state (dysphoric mood), trait (past depression), and interactive effects on correlates of 
attention to address whether putative cognitive mechanisms might be chronically activated or 
only reactive to negative mood state. In general, results support that past depression and current 
dysphoria can affect attentional processing of sad facial affect, as indexed by amplitudes of the 
P3 complex derived from event-related potentials. By comparison, this study provides limited 
evidence to support the existence of deficient sad affect inhibition in at-risk groups.  
Beyond design-imposed differences (e.g., dysphoria group status conferred greater BDI-II 
dysphoria score), risk variables were associated with differentiated levels of rumination and 
various mood states. Consistent with the idea that dysphoria is often characterized by multiple 
negative affects, current dysphoria was associated with greater depressive, angry, anxious, and 
fatigued mood states, as well as reduced vigor-activity and increased rumination. Past depression 
was also associated with marginally greater endorsed rumination. 
Regarding the selective attention task, behavioral data indicated overall engaged and valid 
performance by participants. Dysphoria, depression history, and gender group differences in 
global accuracy for target stimuli were not predicted and were not found. However, it was 
predicted that an inhibitory deficit for depressive information might result in depression 
susceptible (dysphoric formerly depressed) participants mistakenly responding to rare sad 
distracter faces. Interestingly, dysphoria was linked to increased errors of commission for sad 
distracters in women, but not in men. Reaction time data appeared to corroborate that these false 
responses were made more hastily than correct responses. Combined, these findings implicate 
insufficient evaluation and/or inhibition in response to task-irrelevant sad facial stimuli in the 
dysphoric female portion of the sample. Possibly, these errors represent the accidental 
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confounding of personal affective salience (i.e., “that sad face is relevant to me in my dysphoric 
state”) with rule-dictated task relevance (i.e., “that sad face is relevant to me in the task I have 
been instructed to do”).  However, the gender difference was unexpected and lacks a clear 
precedent or other support from the literature. Also somewhat unexpectedly, depression history 
was not related to any significant effects for errors of commission.  
Further examining task reaction times, the never depressed currently dysphoric male group 
exhibited particularly slowed reaction times to targets of all valence and age types. This curious 
result might correspond with the fact that this group also endorsed the lowest level of vigor-
activity and highest level of fatigue-inertia immediately preceding task performance, compared 
to other groups. Thus, low positive affect and concomitantly sluggish initiation may have 
contributed to this small group of never depressed currently dysphoric males’ slower response 
times. Such a finding is akin to cognitive deficits that characterize major depression (van Hoof, 
Jogems-Kosterman, Sabbe, Zitman, & Hulstijn, 1998), but it is not relevant to depressive 
cognitive biases. In this regard, depression risk variables were not associated with any valence-
specific effects on reaction time. It had been predicted that the dysphoric formerly depressed 
group would exhibit facilitated processing of depressive faces and slowed processing of positive 
faces in comparison to the low-risk group, but reaction times revealed no such differences. Thus, 
neither dysphoria nor previous depression preferentially affected the speed of correctly 
responding to sad or happy affect. 
 Theory-driven examination of ERP indicators of attention revealed an interesting pattern 
of findings, implicating interactive effects among dysphoria, depression history, and gender on 
attention to facial affect. As predicted, the group presumed to be at greatest risk of future 
depression (currently dysphoric formerly depressed) showed greater P3 response to sad targets, 
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compared to the group likely to be at least risk (nondysphoric never depressed) and compared to 
their own happy P3 responses. When dysphoria was controlled for across the whole sample, past 
depression was associated with a greater P3 for sad targets than happy targets, an effect absent in 
the never depressed groups. This past depression effect was due to increased P3 response to sad 
target faces and not due to attenuated response to happy target faces; specific predicted between-
group differences were found for the former and not for the latter. 
To contextualize these results, the P3 is presumed to be a psychophysiological indicator of 
cognitive context-updating (Donchin & Coles, 1988) such that when new environmental stimuli 
are evaluated to be salient, the P3 signals the incorporation of the change in working memory. 
Moreover, variability in P3 amplitude is thought to measure attentional allocation (and perhaps 
affective encoding), and thereby relevance for a particular individual (Gasbarri, et al., 2007; 
Oliver-Rodriguez, Guan, & Johnston, 1999; Osterhout & Holcomb, 1995). The more personally 
relevant a stimulus is, the greater the P3 response it evokes, all else being equal. Among normal 
populations, pleasant and unpleasant stimuli are usually deemed more relevant and evoke greater 
P3 amplitude than neutral stimuli (Johnston, Miller, & Burleson, 1986). By extension, in this 
study past depression was associated with greater attentional allocation/perceived relevance for 
sad than happy target faces. This result was theoretically consistent with Joormann and Gotlib’s 
(2007) behavioral finding in which formerly and currently depressed groups showed greater 
selective attention toward sad than happy facial expressions. In contrast, Ilardi, Atchley, Enloe, 
Kwasny, and Garratt (2007) found that current but not past depression was associated with 
elevated attentional P3 responses to negative words compared to a never depressed group. 
Synthesizing the latter two studies and the current study findings, previous depression may be 
characterized by heightened attentional resource allocation to negative faces but not negative 
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words. 
On the other hand, the influence of dysphoria in the current study was conditional on 
gender. In females, past depression—irrespective of dysphoria status—was linked to increased 
P3 amplitude to sad targets (consistent with the full sample effect of past depression). However, 
among males, dysphoria interacted with previous depression. Specifically, males with dual risk 
(past depression and current dysphoria) exhibited significantly greater P3s to sad targets than 
males with singular risk (either past depression or dysphoria), and relatively greater sad P3s than 
the low-risk males. Although supporting evidence of mood state by vulnerability trait-dependent 
cognitive reactivity has been abundant (Scher, et al., 2005), select findings (Atchley, et al., 2003; 
Hayward, Goodwin, Cowen, & Harmer, 2005; Joormann & Gotlib, 2007) suggest that a history 
of depression can be associated with certain depressive cognitive biases in the absence of 
significant dysphoric mood. Interestingly, the present set of findings seems to provide support 
for each of these scenarios, but in separate genders. In females, P3 hyper-reactivity to sad faces 
appeared trait-like, corresponding with solely past depression. In males, similar P3 hyper-
reactivity to sad faces appeared trait-and-state-dependent, arising only in the group endorsing a 
history of depression and current dysphoria. By virtue of this study’s design, this meant that 
approximately twice the proportion of females as males showed elevated P3s to sad targets, a 
theoretically meaningful ratio with respect to depression.  
Epidemiological data have consistently reported a two-fold greater prevalence of 
depression in women than in men (Angst, et al., 2002; Kessler, McGonagle, Swartz, Blazer, & 
Nelson, 1993; Kuehner, 2003), identifying female gender as a risk factor associated with unique 
and/or more frequently activated vulnerability mechanisms (see Hyde, Mezulis, & Abramson, 
2008 for review and integrative model). Although gender differences in ERP components were 
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not predicted, and the found elevated sad P3 in nondysphoric formerly depressed women may 
have been anomalous, at least one speculative account of this finding is worth considering. 
Beginning in adolescence, females more so than males engage in increased appearance-related 
self-surveillance (McKinley & Hyde, 1996), with an implicit goal of social desirability. Such 
increased self-critical comparison to perceived ideals tends to be associated with greater body 
shame and rumination, which in turn predict future depressive symptoms (as reviewed in Hyde, 
et al., 2008). A woman high in self-surveillance would also typically be more motivated to 
monitor how others respond to her, and direct affective facial expressions would provide a rich 
source of evaluative feedback about her social desirability. Seemingly disapproving expressions 
could be particularly salient, as they might trigger an intuitively perceived need to modify 
behavior or appearance. If the formerly depressed women in the current study were more likely 
to self-surveil than their never depressed counterparts, they may have more vigilantly attended to 
sad faces as an automatic, pre-conscious form of negative social feedback monitoring. 
Irrespective of the accuracy of this account, it seems significant that this mode of cognitive 
processing was active in formerly depressed females regardless of their current dysphoria status, 
but was restricted to dysphoric formerly depressed males. On a theoretical level, for any group in 
which it is found, an elevated attentional P3 to sad facial expressions may constitute a 
mechanism, rather than a passive marker, of risk for depression. 
A disproportional attentional bias toward sad faces, as was found in the present study, 
could increase susceptibility to depression in several different ways that are consistent with 
cognitive and interpersonal models of depression (Beck, 1976; Ingram, 1984; Joiner & Coyne, 
1999; Lewinsohn, 1974; Teasdale & Barnard, 1993). To begin with, a sad attentional bias could 
lead one to appraise social interactions more negatively, propagating depressive emotion and 
   
 53 
cognition. If one’s interaction partner smiles once and frowns once, a more intensively attended 
frown might receive prolonged processing and deeper affective encoding. The biased perceiver 
might leave and recall the interaction with feelings of distress, failure, or embarrassment. 
Consistent with this reasoning, a stable negative attributional style for interpersonal events, 
triggered by ambiguous interactions, can elicit severe depressive symptoms (Joiner & Rudd, 
1995). Moreover, depression, which is often characterized by negatively biased information 
processing and attributional style, has been associated with abnormally amplified sad emotional 
responses to others’ negative facial affect (Persad & Polivy, 1993).  
Selectively attending to negative emotional faces might also trigger depressive mood-
maintaining thought patterns in depression-susceptible individuals. For example, Frewen and 
Dozois (2005) found that while viewing negative affective faces, dysphoric women were more 
likely than nondysphoric women to endorse having critical self-thoughts, feeling negatively 
evaluated by others, and feeling responsible for others’ negative emotion. These types of 
automatic thoughts could spur other emotionally charged schema-related cognitions, ultimately 
leading to depressive rumination. A person might think, “His expression tells me he disapproved 
of my comment. Why did I say such a stupid thing? I screw everything up!” This kind of 
rumination may help explain how a combination of negative attention bias and life stressors can 
prospectively predict depressive symptoms (Beevers & Carver, 2003). Although the present 
study employed no measures of online thinking, dysphoria and past depression were related to 
greater endorsed rumination. In turn, rumination was weakly correlated with greater sad-to-
happy P3 differential. 
In addition, hyper-vigilant attention to sad facial feedback might help verify one’s negative 
self-schema, perhaps providing relief from cognitive dissonance at the expense of motivation and 
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self-worth. Research indicates that some depression susceptible individuals seek out negative 
social evaluation—or “negative self-verification”—which tends to maintain or exacerbate 
depressive symptoms (Joiner, 1995; Swann, Wenzlaff, & Tafarodi, 1992). Similarly, hyper-
attending to sad facial affect could verify one’s pessimistic view of the world. Derivative 
automatic thoughts such as, “a lot of other people seem dejected” or “other people appear 
judgmental and rejecting” might bolster a schema of the world as unwelcoming, unfulfilling, and 
unmanageable. As a consequence, disproportionately greater depressive cognition and emotion 
instigated by an attentional bias for sad facial affect might hinder normal social approach 
behaviors (Zauszniewski & Rong, 1999). Social isolation is a common depressive symptom that 
reduces social reinforcement and maintains depressive moods. In these ways, disproportionate 
attention directed toward sad facial emotion might elicit depressotypic cognitive, emotional, and 
interpersonal behavioral responses, possibly giving rise to the kind of cognitive structures and 
ruminative processing that promote and prolong depressed moods (Nolen-Hoeksema, et al., 
1993). In fact, the combination of negative cognitive style and stress-reactive rumination appears 
potent enough that it can predict prospective onsets of depression (Robinson & Alloy, 2003). 
Although the present study could not test complex vulnerability pathways, it did identify in at-
risk groups psychophysiological evidence of a biased attentional mechanism through which 
vulnerability pathways might extend. Moreover, this attentional bias was more reliably 
associated with past depression than with current dysphoria, supporting the notion that different 
operationalizations of depression risk may evince distinct mechanisms of vulnerability (Hyde, et 
al., 2008). 
This investigation also attempted to address other conceptual questions of interest. Most 
importantly, based on past findings with currently and formerly depressed groups (Goeleven, et 
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al., 2006; Joormann, 2004), it was hypothesized that risk variables might be related to deficient 
inhibition of depressive facial affect. In theory, lingering negative content would become 
diffusely associated, triggering frequent rumination and prolonged periods of depressed mood. 
However, this study does not unequivocally support or refute abnormal affective inhibition 
processes. Although dysphoric women showed increased errors of commission for sad distracter 
faces, no between-group differences were found for the N2 potential, and the P3a was not 
reliably extracted. With respect to the P3a, full sample accuracy data indicate that this study’s 
novelty oddball task may have required comparable inhibition for standard faces as distracter 
faces (when looking for a sad target face, the impulse could even be greater to respond to a 
neutral face than a happy face). This would have neutralized the probability that usually prompts 
a P3a response to the rare distracter. Fortunately, other recent studies (Eugene, Joormann, 
Cooney, Atlas, & Gotlib, 2010; Joormann, Nee, Berman, Jonides, & Gotlib, 2010) have provided 
further insight into possible inhibitory deficits in depression-susceptible populations through the 
use of different cognitive neuroscience methods. For example, Krompinger and Simons (2009) 
employed a go/no-go paradigm, and found that undergraduates who were elevated in depressive 
symptoms showed a decreased N2 for negative compared to positive pictures, unlike euthymic 
students. Because the go/no-go task predisposes a participant response on every trial, and the 
oddball task predisposes a non-response, distracter trials are significantly more challenging to 
response-inhibition resources in a go/no-go task than in the novelty oddball task (Bekker, 
Kenemans, & Verbaten, 2005; Donkers & van Boxtel, 2004). The present three-stimulus oddball 
paradigm provided the opportunity to assess selective attention and inhibition for depression-
relevant affects mixed among predominantly neutral faces, arguably a valid analogue to 
naturalistic social settings. However, while the oddball task elicited selective attention 
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differences, it may have been less sensitive to inhibitory deficits than a two-stimulus go/no-go 
task.  Future studies may more usefully employ the no-go N2 and the negative priming P2 
potentials (Yao, et al., 2010) to examine affective inhibition and depression susceptibility. 
 Additionally, although previous depression research (Cavanagh & Geisler, 2006; Deldin, 
Keller, Gergen, & Miller, 2001) suggested that happy faces might evoke attenuated P3s in 
depression susceptible groups and increased P3s in low-risk groups, data from the present study 
did not support either scenario. This result was not particularly surprising, however. Although 
several behavioral studies have reported diminished attention to happy facial affect in depression 
susceptible populations (Joormann & Gotlib, 2007; Suslow, et al., 2004; Suslow, et al., 2001), 
others have reported normal processing of positive affect (Gotlib, Kasch, et al., 2004; Gotlib, 
Krasnoperova, et al., 2004; Karparova, et al., 2005). The present behavioral and 
psychophysiological findings suggest that current dysphoria and a history of depression may not 
be associated with selective attention deficits for happy facial affect. 
 This investigation also sought to examine whether psychophysiological indicators of a 
depressotypic attentional bias might be detectable in presumed at-risk (dysphoric) individuals 
who had never experienced a past episode of depression. If so, this cognitive factor’s precedence 
to a first onset would be established, more strongly implicating it in etiological processes. 
However, independent of depression history, dysphoria was not associated with elevated P3s 
following sad targets. Only groups with a past history of depression, a significant risk factor for 
future depression (American Psychiatric Association, 2000), showed this effect. One possibility 
is that those who are prone to a full-fledged major depressive syndrome are distinguished by 
underlying trait-like (genetic, temperamental, or epigenetic) factors that, when combined with 
stressful events, can result in depression (Hyde, et al., 2008). By reciprocal reasoning, if sad 
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attentional bias is one such factor, it would be most frequently detected in the formerly depressed 
groups in the present study. Additional supportive cross-sectional evidence has indicated that 
abnormally biased attention toward negative facial affect can be elicited in never-depressed 
children with inherited trait-susceptibility to depression (Joormann, Talbot, & Gotlib, 2007). A 
promising future direction would be to compare never-depressed individuals who 
disproportionately direct attention to negative facial affect with non-biased individuals on 
longitudinally-tracked measures of mood, cognition, life stressors, and interpersonal functioning. 
If biased attention to sad facial affect is a depressogenic factor, it might predict greater 
depressive symptoms in conjunction with these other psychosocial factors. 
 Inconsistent with study predictions, the dysphoric formerly depressed group did not show 
attenuated P3s on the nonaffective age-evaluation oddball task. A large collection of studies has 
indicated that major depression is associated with an attenuation of the P3 on oddball tasks 
involving nonaffective stimuli (Ancy, et al., 1996; Kemp, et al., 2009), which is theoretically 
linked to a depressive attentional deficit. The present result may indicate that this attentional 
deficit does not occur in dysphoric individuals below the threshold of major depression. 
Consistent with this interpretation, remission of depressive symptoms has been linked to P3 
normalization (Neuhaus, et al., 2007). Alternatively, it could be that faces, irrespective of their 
affect, are sufficiently relevant and engaging to dysphoric or depressed human observers so as to 
elicit a normal target P3. This possibility is worth investigating in future research.  
On a related note, this study provided evidence that affective faces receive greater 
attentional allocation than nonaffective faces. That is, regardless of diagnostic status, participants 
exhibited greater P3s for affect-evaluation targets than age-evaluation targets. This finding 
appears consistent with the notion that facial affect has always been an indispensable source of 
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information for humans solving problems related to reproduction and survival (Cosmides & 
Tooby, 2000; Wilson, 1999). To translate the present finding to a naturalistic setting, detecting a 
frown or a smile better informs an immediate behavioral response than identifying the age range 
of a neutral face. In short, facial affect is salient and receives preferential attention.  
The present study had several limitations worth considering. First, the present sample 
became undersized once unexpected gender interactions necessitated analyses with three rather 
than two dichotomous participant variables. Given that four participant cells turned to eight, 
power to detect true differences may have been hindered. Conversely, small cell sizes (e.g., five 
in dysphoric formerly depressed male group) may have increased the likelihood of extreme but 
not statistically outlying values driving a group effect. Certainly, replication of the gender-
differentiated P3 results will be needed before any strong conclusions can be drawn from them. 
Importantly, however, the elevated sad P3 associated with past depression was derived from the 
whole sample. As such, this result may be more reliable. Second, the present sample was 
relatively homogeneous with respect to age, race, and ethnicity. Therefore, it cannot be known 
whether the present results generalize beyond this largely Caucasian, college-aged sample. To 
assess this, similar studies enrolling various age, racial, and ethnic groups will be needed. Third, 
the study’s cross-sectional design tacitly implies that participants with dysphoria or past 
depression are at greater risk of depression based on epidemiological risk ratio data. However, 
this design cannot confirm whether these individuals will eventually develop depressive episodes 
at an abnormally elevated rate. Similarly, as previously mentioned, the present study cannot 
confirm whether the found attentional bias for sad affect contributes to any of the speculative 
psychosocial repercussions discussed earlier. Fourth, BDI-II scores extracted from Life Stress 
Inventory (LSI) responses may be inflated. The present study prioritized limiting participants’ 
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social desirability response set in order to reduce false negative assessments of dysphoric 
individuals who might deny symptoms on a more obvious clinical measure. Nevertheless, past 
LSI findings would suggest that the dysphoric groups in the present study would fall within the 
range of dysphoria traditionally measured by the stand-alone BDI-II (Hunt, et al., 2003). Finally, 
given that the temporo-spatial principal components analysis failed to extract a clear P3a 
potential, the study was unable to examine possible between-groups differences related to 
depression susceptibility. 
Despite its limitations, this study provides some intriguing evidence and raises important 
questions for future research. Most significantly, this is the first study to report an association 
between past depression and preferentially elevated P3 amplitude in response to sad facial affect. 
The presence of current dysphoria may increase the likelihood of this response pattern in males. 
These psychophysiological findings suggest that depression vulnerable individuals may be more 
likely to allocate disproportionately increased attentional resources toward sad facial affect in the 
social environment, even without exhibiting behavioral indicators of bias. Theoretically, 
increased attention toward sad expressions could cultivate overly negativistic conceptions of the 
self and proximal social world, induce greater interpersonal stress, and promote rumination. In 
turn, these factors might instigate frequent, prolonged depressed moods and, perhaps, depressive 
episodes.  
Future research will need to answer key questions to pave empirical gaps along theorized 
pathways. For instance, is attention bias to sad facial affect part of a distinctive vulnerability 
pathway or part of a global (i.e., modality agnostic) depressive attention bias that generalizes to 
affective words and pictures as well? Few studies have compared, in the same depressed sample, 
the processing of facial affect and other affective stimulus modalities. However, some evidence 
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indicates that biases to specific facial affects may be dissociable from biases to words of the 
same affect (Deldin et al., 2000; Karparova, et al., 2005). Conceivably, between two depression-
susceptible individuals, one whose sense of worth derives predominantly from social validation 
might be more vigilant to disapproving facial feedback than a person whose self-perceived value 
comes from individual accomplishment (Beck, 1987). Conversely, the achievement-oriented 
individual might attend more to loaded words, such as “loser” or “failure.”  
Further considering modality congruence, how is an attentional bias for sad facial affect 
related to depressive social and cognitive phenomena, such as reassurance-seeking, negative self-
verification, rejection-elicitation, self-surveillance and negative attributional style? In particular, 
does a facial affect bias lead to increased depressive symptoms and increased likelihood of a 
depressive episode via these cognitive-interpersonal avenues? Prospective longitudinal studies 
incorporating relevant factors could help address these important questions. Lastly, it remains 
unknown whether depression susceptibility is characterized by deficient inhibition of negative 
information and related neural correlates. Relevant studies should be informed by the growing 
literature regarding affect inhibition in depression. 
In sum, the present study provides psychophysiological evidence indicating that depression 
vulnerability is linked to increased selective attention to sad facial affect. Future research is 
needed to replicate, clarify, and extend the present findings toward an understanding of the role 
of facial affect processing in depression vulnerability pathways. In this context, the present 
findings may be a modest but important step. 
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Appendix A Block Design to Minimize Ordering Effects, Stimulus Condition Effects, and to 
Distribute Equally Among Groups 
 
The top row represents the target stimulus type that participants were instructed to respond to in 
experimental blocks 1, 2, 3, and 4. Letters represent blocks of facial expression target stimuli. S 
= sad, H = happy, O = older, Y = younger. Thus, S1A indicates that sad facial expressions from 
part 1 of the “A” list of stimuli were the target for a particular block, whereas H2B indicates that 
happy expressions from part 2 of the “B” list were the target for a particular block. To control for 
ordering effects and stimulus condition effects, a separate chart was utilized when recruiting each 
of the four diagnostic groups.  
 Response 
 
Target 1 
 
Target 2 
 
Target 3 
 Target 
4 
MemTask 
1 Right SPracR  SAR OPracR OAR HPracR HBR YPracR YBR     MemTask 
2 Left SPracL SAL OPracL OAL HPracL HBL YPracL YBL MemTask 
3 Right HPracR HAR YPracR YBR SPracR SBR OPracR OAR MemTask 
4 Left HPracL HAL YPracL YBL SPracL SBL OPracL OAL MemTask 
5 Right OPracR OAR SPracR SBR YPracR YBR HPracR HAR MemTask 
6 Left OPracL OAL SPracL SBL YPracL YBL HPracL HAL MemTask 
7 Right YPracR YAR HPracR HAR OPracR OBR SPracR SBR MemTask 
8 Left YPracL YAL HPracL HAL OPracL OBL SPracL SBL MemTask 
9 Right SPracR SBR OPracR OBR HPracR HAR YPracR YAR MemTask 
10 Left SPracL SBL OPracL OBL HPracL HAL YPracL YAL MemTask 
11 Right HPracR HBR YPracR YAR SPracR SAR OPracR OBR MemTask 
12 Left HPracL HBL YPracL YAL SPracL SAL OPracL OBL MemTask 
13 Right YPracR YBR SPracR SAR OPracR OAR HPracR HBR MemTask 
14 Left YPracL YBL SPracL SAL OPracL OAL HPracL HBL MemTask 
15 Right OPracR OBR HPracR HBR YPracR YAR SPracR SAR MemTask 
16 Left OPracL OBL HPracL HBL YPracL YAL SPracL SAL MemTask 
17 Right SPracR SAR OPracR OBR HPracR HBR YPracR YAR MemTask 
18 Left SPracL SAL OPracL OBL HPracL HBL YPracL YAL MemTask 
19 Right HPracR HAR YPracR YAR SPracR SBR OPracR OBR MemTask 
20 Left HPracL HAL YPracL YAL SPracL SBL OPracL OBL MemTask 
21 Right OPracR OAR SPracR SAR YPracR YBR HPracR HBR MemTask 
22 Left OPracL OAL SPracL SAL YPracL YBL HPracL HBL MemTask 
23 Right YPracR YAR HPracR HBR OPracR OBR SPracR SAR MemTask 
24 Left YPracL YAL HPracL HBL OPracL OBL SPracL SAL MemTask 
25 Right SPracR SBR OPracR OAR HPracR HAR YPracR YBR MemTask 
26 Left SPracL SBL OPracL OAL HPracL HAL YPracL YBL MemTask 
27 Right HPracR HBR YPracR YBR SPracR SAR OPracR OAR MemTask 
28 Left HPracL HBL YPracL YBL SPracL SAL OPracL OAL MemTask 
29 Right YPracR YBR SPracR SBR OPracR OAR HPracR HAR MemTask 
30 Left YPracL YBL SPracL SBL OPracL OAL HPracL HAL MemTask 
31 Right OPracR OBR HPracR HAR YPracR YAR SPracR SBR MemTask 
32 Left OPracL OBL HPracL HAL YPracL YAL SPracL SBL MemTask 
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Appendix B 
  
Tables of ERP Planned Contrasts from Oddball Task 
 
 
Table 2. Between-Groups Planned Contrasts of ERP Component Mean Voltages 
 Group 1 (lesser magnitude)       <      Group 2 (greater magnitude) Trial Type N200 P300a P300b 
1 Dysphoric formerly depressed Nondysphoric never depressed Sad distracter no N/A  
2 Nondysphoric never depressed Dysphoric formerly depressed Sad target   yes 
3 Dysphoric formerly depressed Nondysphoric never depressed Happy targets   no 
4 Dysphoric formerly depressed Nondysphoric never depressed Old & young targets   no 
Table 1 outlines between-groups planned contrasts that were hypothesized to exhibit significant differences in mean voltage with 
respect to particular ERP components. Expected differences are highlighted in gray with an indication of whether or not the 
prediction was supported. The P300a was not reliably extracted and could not be tested for differences. 
 
 
Table 3. Within-Group Planned Contrast of ERP Component Mean Voltages 
 Group Trial Type 1 (lesser)         <     Trial Type 2 (greater) N200 P300a P300b 
5 Dysphoric formerly depressed Sad distracter Happy distracter no N/A  
6 Dysphoric formerly depressed Happy target Sad target   yes 
Table 2 outlines within-groups planned contrasts that were hypothesized to exhibit significant differences in mean voltage with 
respect to particular ERP components. Expected differences are highlighted in gray with an indication of whether or not the 
prediction was supported.  The P300a was not reliably extracted and could not be tested for differences. 
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Appendix C 
 
Beck Depression Inventory, Second Edition 
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Appendix D 
 
Life Stress Inventory 
 
 Please read each group of statements carefully, then pick out the one statement in each group 
which best describes the way that you have been feeling during the past two weeks including 
today!  Circle the number next to the statement you have picked.  Do not leave any statements 
blank. 
 If several statements in the group seem to apply equally well, simply circle the largest 
number.  Be sure that you do not mark more than one statement for item 34 (change in sleeping 
pattern) and item 35 (change in appetite). 
 
Item 1. 
0 My life is not stressful. 
1 My life is as stressful as it used to be. 
2 My life is more stressful than usual. 
3 My life is unbearably stressful. 
 
Item 2 
0 I am not busy 
1 I am as busy as others. 
2 I am busier than other people. 
3 I am busy all the time. 
 
Item 3 
0 I am not pressured at work. 
1 I have an average amount of pressure on me at work. 
2 I have more pressure on me at work than most people. 
3 I have an extraordinary amount of pressure on me at work. 
 
Item 4 
0 I am no more restless or wound up than usual. 
1 I feel more restless or wound up than usual. 
2 I am so restless or agitated that It’s hard to stay still. 
3 I am so restless or agitated that I have to keep moving or doing something. 
 
Item 5 
0 I am not discouraged about my future. 
1 I feel more discouraged about my future than I used to be. 
2 I do not expect things to work out for me. 
3 I feel my future is hopeless and will only get worse. 
 
Item 6 
0 I do not feel like a failure 
1 I have failed more than I should have. 
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2 As I look back, I see a lot of failure. 
3 I feel that I am a total failure as a person. 
Item 7 
0 I get as much pleasure as I ever did from the things I enjoy. 
1 I don’t enjoy things as much as I used to. 
2 I get very little pleasure from the things I used to enjoy. 
3 I can’t get any pleasure from the things I used to enjoy. 
 
Item 8 
0 I don’t feel particularly guilty. 
1 I feel guilty over many things I have done or should have done. 
2 I feel quite guilty most of the time. 
3 I feel guilty all of the time. 
 
Item 9 
0 My life does not change much. 
1 there are a normal number of changes occurring in my life right now. 
2 There are a  large number of changes occurring in my life right now. 
3 There are an excessive number of changes in my life right now and I cannot control them. 
 
Item 10 
0 I don’t feel I am being punished. 
1 I feel I may be punished. 
2 I expect to be punished. 
3 I feel I am being punished. 
 
Item 11 
0 I feel the same about myself as ever. 
1 I have lost confidence in myself. 
2 I am disappointed in myself. 
3 I dislike myself. 
 
Item 12 
0 I don’t criticize or blame myself more than usual. 
1 I am more critical of myself than I used to be. 
2 I criticize myself for all my faults. 
3 I blame myself for everything bad that happens. 
 
Item 13 
0 I do not have bad luck. 
1 I have the same amount of luck as everyone else. 
2 I have worse luck than normal. 
3 I have bad luck frequently. 
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Item 14 
0 I do not have a lot of responsibilities 
1 I have an average number of responsibilities 
2 I have more than an average number of responsibilities 
3 I have an extraordinary number of responsibilities.   
 
Item 15 
0 I don’t cry anymore than I used to. 
1 I cry more than I used to. 
2 I cry over every little thing. 
3 I feel like crying but I can’t. 
 
Item 16 
0 People are not rude to me. 
1 People are rude to me on occasion.  
2 People are rude to me quite often. 
3 People are always rude to me. 
 
Item 17 
0 I have control over how I spend my time. 
1 I have some control over how I spend my time. 
2 I have little control over how I spend my time. 
3 I have almost no control over how I spend my time. 
 
Item 18 
0 My home life is calm and peaceful. 
1 My home life sometimes gets hectic. 
2 My home life sometimes feels difficult to manage. 
3 My home life feels out of control. 
 
Item 19 
0 I have not lost interest in other people or activities.  
1 I am less interested in other people or activities than before. 
2 I have lost most of my interest in other people or things. 
3 It’s hard to get interested in anything. 
 
Item 20 
0 I make decision about as well as ever. 
1 I find it more difficult to make decisions than usual. 
2 I have much greater difficulty in making decisions that I used to. 
3 I have trouble making any decisions. 
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Item 21 
0 My family is a source of support. 
1 My family is a source of concern. 
2 It can be stressful dealing with my family. 
3 My family is a major source of stress. 
 
Item 22 
0 I do not feel I am worthless. 
1 I don’t consider myself as worthwhile or useful as I used to be. 
2 I feel more worthless compared to other people. 
3 I feel utterly worthless. 
 
Item 23 
0 I do not have any unexpected events in my life. 
1 I have as many unexpected events in my life as others do. 
2 I have more many unexpected events in my life than others do. 
3.  Unexpected events constantly occur in my life. 
 
Item 24 
0 I have as much energy as ever. 
1 I have less energy than I used to have. 
2 I don’t have enough energy to do very much. 
3 I don’t have enough energy to do anything. 
 
Item 25 
0 I am no more irritable than usual. 
1 I am more irritable than usual. 
2 I am much more irritable than usual. 
3 I am irritable all the time. 
 
Item 26 
0 My bills are easy to manage. 
1 My bills sometimes concern me. 
2 It can be stressful dealing with my bills. 
3 My bills are a major source of stress. 
 
Item 27 
0 I do not feel sad. 
1 I feel sad much of the time. 
2 I am sad all the time. 
3 I am so sad or unhappy that I can’t stand it. 
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Item 28 
0 I can concentrate as well as ever. 
1 I can’t concentrate as well as ever. 
2 It’s hard to keep my mind on anything for very long. 
3 I find I can’t concentrate on anything. 
 
Item 29 
0 I am no more tired or fatigued than usual. 
1 I get tired or fatigued more easily than usual. 
2 I am too tired or fatigued to do a lot of the things I used to do. 
3 I am too tired or fatigued to most of the things I used to do. 
 
Item 30 
0 I have as a many opportunities in my life as anyone else does. 
1 My opportunities sometimes seem limited. 
2 I do not have many opportunities. 
3 I am trapped by my life. 
 
Item 31 
0 I have not noticed any recent changes in my interest in sex. 
1 I am less interested in sex than I used to be. 
2 I am much less interested in sex now. 
3 I have lost interest in sex completely. 
 
Item 32 
0 Traffic does not bother me. 
1 Traffic is no more annoying to me than it is to anyone else. 
2 Traffic often irritates me. 
3 Traffic is a major source of stress in my life. 
 
Item 33 
0 I don’t have any thoughts of killing myself. 
1 I have thoughts of killing myself, but I would not carry them out. 
2 I would like to kill myself. 
3 I would kill myself if I had the chance. 
 
Item 34 
0 I have not experienced any change in my sleeping pattern. 
1a  I sleep somewhat more than usual OR 
1b  I sleep somewhat less than usual. 
2a I sleep a lot more than usual OR 
2b I sleep a lot less than usual. 
3a I sleep most of the day OR 
3b I wake up 1-2 hours early and can’t get back to sleep. 
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Item 35 
0 I have not experienced any changes in my appetite. 
___________________________________________ 
1a My appetite is somewhat less than usual OR 
1b My appetite is somewhat greater than usual. 
___________________________________________ 
2a My appetite is much less than before OR 
2b My appetite is much greater than usual. 
___________________________________________ 
3a I have no appetite at all OR 
3b I crave food all the time. 
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Appendix E 
 
Ruminative Response Scale short form from the Response Styles Questionnaire 
 
People think and do many things when they feel down. Please read each of the items below and 
indicate whether you never, sometimes, often, or always think or do each of the following things 
when you feel down, sad, or depressed. Please indicate what you generally do, not what you 
think you should do. 
 
1. Go someplace alone to think about your feelings 
 
Almost never              Sometimes                 Often                Almost always 
 
 
2. Isolate yourself and think about the reasons why you feel sad 
 
Almost never              Sometimes                 Often                Almost always 
 
 
3. Go away by yourself and think about why you feel this way 
 
Almost never              Sometimes                 Often                Almost always 
 
 
4. Write down what you are thinking about and analyze it 
 
Almost never              Sometimes                 Often                Almost always 
 
 
5. Listen to sad music 
 
Almost never              Sometimes                 Often                Almost always 
 
 
6. Think “Why do I always react this way?” 
 
Almost never              Sometimes                 Often                Almost always 
 
 
7. Think about a recent situation, wishing it had gone better 
 
Almost never              Sometimes                 Often                Almost always 
 
 
8. Think about how angry you are with yourself 
 
Almost never              Sometimes                 Often                Almost always  
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Appendix F 
 
Profile of Mood States questionnaire 
 
Below is a list of words that describe feelings that people have. Please read each word carefully. 
Then circle the number that best describes how you feel RIGHT NOW. 
 
  Not at all A little Moderately Quite a bit Extremely 
1. Tense 0 1 2 3 4 
2. Angry 0 1 2 3 4 
3. Worn out 0 1 2 3 4 
4. Lively 0 1 2 3 4 
5. Confused 0 1 2 3 4 
6. Shaky 0 1 2 3 4 
7. Sad 0 1 2 3 4 
8. Active 0 1 2 3 4 
9. Grouchy 0 1 2 3 4 
10. Energetic 0 1 2 3 4 
11. Unworthy 0 1 2 3 4 
12. Uneasy 0 1 2 3 4 
13. Fatigued 0 1 2 3 4 
14. Annoyed 0 1 2 3 4 
15. Discouraged 0 1 2 3 4 
16. Nervous 0 1 2 3 4 
17. Lonely 0 1 2 3 4 
18. Muddled 0 1 2 3 4 
19. Exhausted 0 1 2 3 4 
20. Anxious 0 1 2 3 4 
21. Gloomy 0 1 2 3 4 
22. Sluggish 0 1 2 3 4 
23. Weary 0 1 2 3 4 
24. Bewildered 0 1 2 3 4 
25. Furious 0 1 2 3 4 
26. Efficient 0 1 2 3 4 
27. Full of pep 0 1 2 3 4 
28. Bad-tempered 0 1 2 3 4 
29. Forgetful 0 1 2 3 4 
30. Vigorous 0 1 2 3 4 
 
Please ensure you have answered every item. 
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Appendix G 
 
The Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV-I 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PAST MAJOR DEPRESSIVE EPISODE 
 
 IF NOT CURRENTLY DEPRESSED: 
Have you ever had a period when you 
were feeling depressed or down most of 
the day nearly every day? (What was 
that like?) 
 
 IF CURRENTLY DEPRESSED BUT 
FULL CRITERIA ARE NO MET, 
SCREEN FOR PAST MDE: Has there 
ever been another time when you were 
depressed or down most of the day 
nearly every day? (What was that like?) 
 
IF YES: When was that? How long did it 
last? (As long as two weeks?) 
 
 IF PAST DEPRESSED MOOD: 
During that time, did you lose interest or 
pleasure in things you usually enjoyed? 
(What was that like?) 
 
 IF NO PAST DEPRESSED MOOD: 
What about a time when you lost interest 
or pleasure in things you usually 
enjoyed? 
(What was that like?) 
 
 IF YES: When was that? Was it nearly 
every day? How long did it last? (As long 
as two weeks?) 
 
Have you had more that one time like 
that? (Which time was the worst?) 
 
IF UNCLEAR: Have you had any times 
like that in the past year? 
MDE CRITERIA 
 
A. Five or more of the following 
symptoms have been present during the 
same two-week period and represent a 
change from previous functioning; at 
least one of the symptoms was either  
(1) depressed mood or  
(2) loss of interest or pleasure. 
 
(1) depressed mood most of the 
day, nearly every day, as 
indicated by either subjective 
report (e.g., feels sad or 
empty) or observation made 
by others (e.g., appears 
tearful). Note: in children and 
adolescents, can be irritable 
mood. 
 
(2)  Markedly diminished 
interest or pleasure in all, or 
almost all, activities most of 
the day, nearly every day (as 
indicated either by subjective 
account or observation 
made by others) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: IF MORE THAN ONE PAST 
EPISODE IS LIKELY, SELECT THE 
“WORST” ONE FOR YOUR INQUIRY 
ABOUT A PAST MAJOR DEPRESSIVE 
EPISODE. HOWEVER, IF THERE WAS 
AN EPISODE IN THE PAST YEAR, ASK 
ABOUT THAT EPISODE EVEN IF IT 
WAS NOT THE WORST. 
?   1   2   3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
?   1   2   3 
 
IF 
NEITHER 
ITEM (1) 
NOR (2) IS 
CODED 
“3,” GO TO 
CURRENT 
MANIC 
EPISODE, 
* A   18 
? = inadequate information 1 = absent or false 2 = subthreshold 3 threshold or true 
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FOR THE FOLLOWING 
QUESTIONS, FOCUS ON THE 
WORST TWO WEEKS OF THE 
PAST MAJOR DEPRESSIVE 
EPISODE THAT YOU ARE 
INQUIRING ABOUT 
 
During that (TWO WEEK 
PERIOD)… 
…did you lose or gain any weight? 
(How much?) (Were you trying to 
lose weight?) 
 
IF NO: How was your 
appetite? (What about 
compared to your usual 
appetite?) (Did you have to 
force yourself to eat?) (Eat 
[less/more] than usual?) 
(Was that nearly every day?) 
 
 
…how were you sleeping? (Trouble 
falling asleep, waking frequently, 
trouble staying asleep, waking too 
early, OR sleeping too much? How 
many hours a night compared to 
usual?  Was that nearly every 
night?) 
 
 
..were you so fidgety or restless that 
you were unable to sit still? (Was it 
so bad that other people noticed it? 
What did they notice? Was that 
nearly every day?) 
  
IF NO: what about the 
opposite – talking or moving 
more slowly than is normal 
for you? (Was it so bad that 
other people notice it? What 
did they notice? Was it 
nearly every day?) 
 
…what was your energy like? (Tired 
all the time? Nearly every day?) 
 
NOTE: WHEN RATING THE 
FOLLOWING ITEMS, CODE “1” IF 
CLEARLY DIRECTLY DUE TO A 
GENERAL MEDICAL CONDITION, OR 
TO MOOD INCONGRUENT 
DELUSIONS OR HALLUCINATIONS 
 
(3) significant weight loss when not 
dieting, or weight gain (e.g., a change 
of more than 5% of body weight in a 
month), or decrease or increase in 
appetite nearly every day.  
NOTE: in children, consider failure to 
make expected weight gains. 
  
Check if: 
__ Weight loss or decreased 
appetite 
__ Weight gain or increased 
appetite  
 
 
(4) insomnia or hypersomnia nearly 
every day 
 Check if: 
 __ insomnia  
 __ hypersomnia 
 
 
 
(5) psychomotor agitation or retardation 
nearly every day (observable by others, 
not merely subjective feelings of 
restlessness or being slowed down) 
 Check if 
 __ psychomotor agitation 
 __ psychomotor retardation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(6) fatigue or loss of energy nearly 
every day  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
?   1   2   3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
?   1   2   3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
?   1   2   3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
?   1   2   3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
? = inadequate information  1 = absent or false  2 = subthreshold  3 = threshold or true 
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During that time… 
 
…how did you feel about yourself? 
(Worthless?) (Nearly every day?) 
 
IF NO: What about feeling 
guilty about things you had 
done or not done? (Nearly 
every day?) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
…did you have trouble thinking or 
concentrating? (what kinds of things 
did it interfere with?) (Nearly every 
day?) 
 
IF NO: was it hard to make 
decisions about everyday 
things? (Nearly every day?) 
 
 
…were things so bad that you were 
thinking a lot about death or that you 
would be better off dead? What 
about thinking of hurting yourself? 
 
IF YES: did you do anything 
to hurt yourself? 
 
 
(7) feelings of worthlessness or excessive 
or inappropriate guilt (which may be 
delusional) nearly every day (not merely 
self-reproach or guilt about being sick) 
NOTE: CODE “1” OR “2” FOR LOW 
SELF-ESTEEM BUT NOT 
WORTHLESSNESS 
 Check if: 
 __worthlessness 
 __inappropriate guilt 
 
 
 
(8)diminished ability to think or 
concentrate, or indecisiveness, nearly 
every day (either by subjective account or 
as observed by others) 
 Check if:  
 __diminished ability to think 
 __indecisiveness  
 
 
(9) recurrent thoughts of death (not just 
fear of dying), recurrent suicidal ideation 
without a specific plan, or a suicide 
attempt or a specific plan for committing 
suicide 
NOTE: CODE “1” FOR SELF-
MUTILATION W/O SUICIDAL INTENT 
 Check if: 
 __thoughts of own death 
 __suicidal ideation 
 __specific plan 
 __suicide attempt 
 
 
?   1   2   3    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
?   1   2   3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
?   1   2   3 
? = inadequate information  1 = absent or false  2 = subthreshold  3 = threshold or true 
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IF NOT ALREADY ASKED: Has there 
been any other time when you were 
(depressed/ OWN WORDS) and had 
even more of the symptoms than I just 
asked you about? 
 
 IF YES: RETUREN TO *PAST 
MAJOR DEPRESSIVE EPISODE, * A. 
12, AND CHECK WHEHTER THERE 
HAVE ANY OTHER MAJOR 
DEPRESSIVE EPISODES THAT 
WERE MORE SEVERE AND/OR 
CAUSED MORE SYMPTOMS. IF SO, 
ASK ABOU TTHAT EPISODE. 
 
 IF NO: GO TO *CURRENT MANIC 
EPISODE, *A. 18 
 
IF UNCLEAR: Has (depressive 
episode/OWN WORDS) made it hard 
for you to do your work, take care of 
things at home, or get along with other 
people? 
 
IF NOT ALREADY ASKED: Has there 
been any other time when you were 
*depressed / OWN WORDS) and it 
caused even more problems than the 
time I just asked you about ? 
 
IF YES: RETURN TO *PAST 
MAJOR DEPRESSIVE EPISODE, 
*A.12, AND CHECK WHETHER 
THERE HAVE BEEN ANY OTHER 
JAJOR DEPRESSIVE EPISODES 
THAT WERE MORE SEVERE 
AND/OR CAUSED MORE 
SYMPTOMS. IF SO, ASK ABOUT 
THAT EPISODE. 
 
      
   
AT LEAST FIVE OF THE 
ABOVE SXS [A(1-9)] ARE 
CODED “3” AND AT LEAST 
ONE OF THE IS ITEM 1 OR 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: DSM-IV criterion B 
(i.e., does not meet criteria for 
a Mixed Episode) has been 
omitted from the SCID. 
 
C. The symptoms cause 
clinically significant distress or 
impairment in social, 
occupational, or other 
important areas of functioning. 
1  3 
        
       Continue 
        Below 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
?   1   2   3   
 
 
 
Continue 
on next 
page 
? = inadequate information  1 = absent or false  2 = subthreshold  3 = threshold or true 
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Just before this began, were you 
physically ill? 
 
IF YES: what did the doctor say? 
 
Just before this began, were you 
using any medications? 
 
IF YES: any change in the amount 
you were using? 
 
Just before this began, were you 
drinking or using any street drugs? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IF UNKNOWN: has there been any 
other time when you were (depressed/ 
OWN WORDS) like this but were not 
(using SUBSTANCE/ill with GMC)? 
 
IF YES: GO TO *PAST MAJOR 
DEPRESSIVE EPISODE, *A. 12 AND 
CHECK WHETHER THERE HAS 
BEEN ANY OTHER MAJOR 
DEPRESSIVE EPISODE NOT DUE 
TO A SUBSTNACE OR GENERAL 
MEDICAL CONDITION. IF SO, ASK 
ABOUT THAT EPISODE. 
 
 IF NO: GO TO *CURRENT MANIC 
EPISODE, *A. 18 
D. the symptoms are not due to 
the direct physiological effects of 
a substance (e.g., a drug of 
abuse, medication) or to a general 
medical condition (e.g., 
hypothyroidism) 
 
 
IF THERE IS AN INDICATION 
THAT THE DEPRESSION MAY 
BE SECONDARY (I.E., A DIRECT 
PHYSIOLOGICAL 
CONSEQUENCE OF A GMC OR 
SUBSTANCE, GO TO *GMC OR 
SUBSTANCE, GO TO 
*GMC/SUBSTANCE, * A. 43, 
AND RETURN HERE TO MAKE 
A RATING OF “1” OR “3” 
 
REFER TO LIST OF GENERAL 
MEDICAL CONDITIONS AND 
SUBSTANCES, A. 4 
 
 
1                
DUE TO 
SUBSTANCE 
USE OR 
GMC 
 
 
 
3 
PRIMARY 
MOOD 
EPISODE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONTINUE 
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(did this begin soon after someone 
close to you died?) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IF UNKNOWN: has there been any 
other time when you were 
(depressed/OWN WORDS) like this 
that did not occur after someone 
close to you died? 
 
IF YES: GO TO *PAST MAJOR 
DEPRESSIVE EPISODE, 8A. 12 
AND CHECK WHETHER THERE 
HAS BEEN ANY OTHER MAJOR 
DEPRESSIVE EPISODE THAT 
WAS NOT BETTER ACCOUNTED 
FOR BY BEREAVEMENT. IF SO, 
ASK ABOUT THAT EPISODE. 
 
IF NO: TO TO *CURRENT MANIC 
EPISODE, *A. 18 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
How old were you when (PAST 
MAJOR DEPRESSIVE EPISODE) 
started? 
 
How many separate times in your life 
have you been (depressed/ OWN 
WORDS) nearly every day for at 
least two weeks and had several of 
the symptoms that you described, 
like (SXS OR WORST EPISODE)? 
E. The symptoms are not better 
accounted for by [simple] 
Bereavement, i.e., after the loss 
of a loved one, the symptoms 
persist for longer than 2 months 
or are characterized by marked 
functional impairment morbid 
preoccupation with 
worthlessness, suicidal ideation, 
psychotic symptoms or 
psychomotor retardation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MAJOR DEPRESSIVE 
EPISODE CRITERIA A, B, D, 
AND E ARE CODED “3” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Age at onset of Past Major 
Depressive Episode coded 
above 
 
Total number of Major 
Depressive Episodes (CODE 99 
IF TOO NUMEROUS OR 
INDISTINCT TO COUNT) 
 
NOTE: TO RECORD DETAILS 
OF OTHER PAST EPISODES, 
GO TO J. 9 (OPTIONAL) 
1                        
SIMPLE 
BEREAVEMENT 
 
3  
AT LEAST ONE 
EPISODE NOT 
SIMPLE 
BEREAVEMENT  
 
 
 
 
 
CONTINUE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1                         
GO TO 
 *CURRENT  
MANIC  
EPISODE 
 *A. 18 
 
 
3 
PAST MAJOR 
DEPRESSIVE 
EPISODE 
 
 
___               ___ 
 
 
___               ___ 
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